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SALES TAXATION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
PAUL J. HARTMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

A treatment of the constitutional problems involved in "sales

taxation" concerning multi-state sales transactions should cover more
than "sales taxes" as that terminology ordinarily may be understood.
The ordinary "sales tax" includes within its scope all business sales
of tangible personal property at either the retailing, wholesaling,
or manufacturing state. The statute, of course, often gives exemptions
from the tax.
In many instances, however, the "sales tax" also is imposed on
other kinds of transactions. Sometimes the sale of professional services and other services, of real property, and of intangible personal
property is covered by the tax. Some states also include the receipt
of dividends, interest, rental payments, wages and salaries. The
extraction and sale of unmanufactured natural resources may also be
included in the reach of a "sales tax."
Haig and Shoup,' leading authorities in the field, group "sales taxes"
into four categories:
(a) the retail sales tax-the most restricted type-is imposed only
upon sales of tangible personal property at retail or for use or consumption. This category includes taxes which affect sales of services of public utilities and admissions.
(b) the general sales tax reaches sales of tangible personal property
both at retail and for resale, and also the extracting of natural resources and manufacturing. This category also includes certain taxes
which reach sales of services by business enterprises, sales of admissions and sales of real property.
(c) gross receipts tax, which includes the essential elements of
the general sales tax, and in addition it is levied upon sales of personal and/or professional services, and in some instances sales of
intangibles.
(d) gross income tax, which taxes gross income from all sources,
including, in addition to the main elements noted above, gross income from all sources, such as gross income from rents, interest and
salaries.
In addition to the above four categories of "sales taxes," this discussion of "sales taxation" will include:
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. HAIG AND Snoup, THE SALES TAX IN AMERICAN STATES 3-4 (1934).
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(e) various species of use taxes; and
(f) various privilege taxes affecting the occupation of selling. Consequently, the subject matter of this treatment of "sales taxation"
will consider materials from all of the foregoing six categories in
order to give adequate coverage of the subject under consideration.
In dealing with the subject of sales taxation of multi-state transactions we must reckon principally with two clauses of the Federal Constitution. Both the commerce clause and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment have a direct impact on the taxing power of the states as they seek to harvest revenue from multistate sales transactions. Most of the emphasis will be upon the commerce clause, but the due process clause requires some consideration.
The scope of the protection afforded by the commerce clause has
been widened by the Court to include much more than the actual
movement of the commerce itself across state lines.2 Thus, taxes for
the privilege of engaging in various interstate activities often have
been called into question on commerce clause grounds. 3 Also, commerce clause protection has been invoked frequently where local taxes
were levied on receipts derived from interstate transactions.4 Moreover, taxes levied on the means and instrumentalities used in connection with the interstate commerce often have run into commerce
clause difficulty.5 Even though a particular tax can withstand a
2. Taxes on the actual transportation of the commerce were banned comparatively early in our constitutional history. Case of the State Freight Tax,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886); Champlain
Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922); Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v.
Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926). That is present day constitutional doctrine.
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
3. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954); MichiganWisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); Memphis Steam
Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Spector Motor Serv., Inc.
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts,
268 U.S. 203 (1925). Presently there will be considerable discussion of this
facet of protection.
4. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954); Joseph v.
Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946); Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
This phase of protection will occupy considerable space in the discussion of the
subject matter under consideration.
5. Aside from property taxes, the means and instrumentalities thought to be
an integral part of the commerce itself were virtually free from taxation for
many years. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S.
90 (1937); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338
(1930); Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929); Ozark Pipe
Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925). Whatever the particular form of
the tax levied on the means and instrumentalities, if the Court regarded it
essentially only property taxation, it would be sustained. St. Louis S.W. Ry.
v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914); United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223
U.S. 335 (1912); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Attorney Gen., 125 U.S. 530 (1888). More recently
privileges closely connected with interstate commerce have been regarded
as distinct from the commerce for purposes of taxation. Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938). The textual discussion
of the subject here under consideration will consider some aspects of taxation
on the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. For a more com-
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commerce clause attack on any of the foregoing grounds, nevertheless
it .may be challenged on the ground that it discriminates against
interstate commerce.6 We will see that sales taxation cuts across all
of these aspects of commerce clause protection.
While the due process clause has figured less frequently than the
commerce clause in sales taxation of multi-state transactions, it does
nevertheless place limitations on such revenue measures. Due process
requirements are concerned with whether the tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits or protection afforded by
the taxing state.7 The due process clause prevents the taxing power
from reaching or laying hold of a subject with which the state has
no sufficient nexus; it keeps the taxing power at home, so to speak.8
So, to employ a metaphor from the classics, in order for a tax
craft to reach the harbor of constitutionality, it must sail safely past
the Scylla of the commerce clause, as well as the Charybdis of due
process.

I. TAXES ON THE OccuPATIoN

OF

SELLING

That a state may require payment of a tax for the privilege of engaging in a local business or occupation, although mingled with interstate business, in so far as the commerce clause is concerned, is a
general proposition no longer debatable.9 However, taxes thought by
the Supreme Court to be levied upon the privilege of carrying on
interstate commerce, regardless of the amount of the levy, have
uniformly been held obnoxious to the commerce clause on the ground
that the privilege is given by the national government and not the
state government. 10 "No State," says the Court, "can compel a party,
individual, or corporation to pay for the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce."" "Any such excise burdens interstate commerce
and is therefore invalid," declares the Court, "without regard to
plete treatment of property taxes and interstate commerce, see HARTMAN,
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 73 (1953).
6. Memphis Steam. Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311
U.S. 454 (1940). We will have considerable to say a little later in this discussion about discrimination.
7. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); see Nelson v. Montgomery Ward,
312 U.S. 373, 375 (1941). In our later discussion of the collection aspects
of the use tax we will see that due process has been of considerable sig-

nificance.

8. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); see Ott v. Mississippi
Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.,
311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).

9. Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953) (annual license tax computed
by the number of trucks used by taxpayer where each taxed truck did some
local as well as interstate business); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue,
340 U.S. 534 (1951); Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 498 (1918);
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U.S. 339 (1892).
10. We will examine in detail a wide variety of such taxes as our discussion
proceeds.
11. Atlantic & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 162 (1903).
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measure or amount."'12 Moreover, "the constitutional infirmity of
such a tax persists," concludes the Court, "no matter how fairly it
is apportioned to business done within the state."'13 That commerce
clause infirmity is present whether the taxpayer is engaged in interstate commerce exclusively, or whether a portion of the taxed business is local with the tax levied either upon the privilege of engaging
in the interstate branch or upon the whole business.' 4
The fact that a portion of a business is local and taxable has not
justified a tax which also is imposed on the interstate branch of
the business. To be sustained as a tax for the privilege of engaging
in a local business or occupation, where the interstate and local facets
of the business are intermingled, the tax cannot extend beyond the
local aspects of the business; it cannot constitutionally apply to the
interstate phases. 15 A privilege or occupation tax which a state imposes with respect to both interstate and intrastate business, through
an indiscriminate and inseparable application to instrumentalities
common to both branches of the business, frequently has fallen before a commerce clause attack.16 The tax will be upheld, however,
if the statute is of a separable nature so that the levy on the interstate
aspects can be eliminated from the assessment.'7
A particular type of privilege tax of the occupational variety
frequently before the Court on commerce clause grounds is an exaction imposed on the occupation of selling goods shipped through interstate channels. One familiar form the tax takes is a levy on the
occupation of soliciting and negotiating sales of goods prior to their
interstate shipment into the purchaser's state. That is the sort of tax
levied on the itinerant salesman, sometimes called a "drummer,"
who solicits orders for goods to be delivered to the purchaser from
an out-of-state source of supply. The fountainhead of a plethora
of decisions in this field is Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District.18
There the Court refused, on commerce clause grounds, to allow the
taxing authorities of Shelby County, Tennessee, to exact a license
tax from a salesman not having a regularly licensed place of business
12. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 217 (1925).
13. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951).
14. Business exclusively interstate: Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347
U.S. 359 (1954); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951);
State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931). Levied on
the whole of mixed local and interstate business: Memphis Steam Laundry
Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Texas Transp. & Terminal Co. v.

New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150 (1924).
15. Postal TeL-Cable Co. v. City of Fremont, 255 U. S. 124 (1921); Ewing v.
City of Leavenworth, 226 U.S. 464 (1913).

16. E.g., Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935); Bowman
v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Tennessee v. Pullman So. Car Co.,
117 U.S. 51 (1886).
17. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Ratterman v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888).
18. 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
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in the taxing district, as a condition precedent to soliciting trade
within the taxing unit. The salesman was soliciting orders for an
out-of-state merchant who would subsequently fill the order by interstate shipment. In striking down the tax, a majority of the Robbins
Court was of the opinion that the tax erected a very real obstacle to
the development of interstate trade. The Court visualized that such a
tax would hamper the marketing of products in other states. The Court
was solicitous about protecting the out-of-state manufacturer or
merchant who would not know whether there would be any demand
or market for his products, and would need to obtain orders prior to
the interstate shipment of his wares. In its condemnation of the
Robbins tax the Court laid down a broad, sweeping rule that the
"negotiations of sales of goods which are in another state, for the
purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiations
are made, is interstate commerce."1 9 The Court stated that "interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount
of tax . . . [is] laid on domestic commerce . .. "20 In condemnatory
doctrinal declarations that became familiar, the tax was labelled a
burden on interstate commerce. For good measure, the Court also
indicated that the tax should be invalidated as a discrimination
against interstate commerce.
Including the Robbins case, the Court has made short shrift of at
least twenty-one such statutes and municipal ordinances to the extent
they imposed a tax on the occupation of selling goods prior to their
interstate shipment. This doctrine of immunity has not been limited
to the state of solicitation and delivery. Such taxes levied on the
occupation of selling would be condemned whether imposed by the
state of the buyer 2' or imposed by the state of the seller.22 Activities
which are insulated from this species of occupation tax include not
of the sales, but also the delivery
only the solicitation and negotiation
23
of the article to the purchaser.
The itinerant salesman who engages in interstate selling occupies
19. 120 U.S. at 497.
20. Ibid.

21. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell,
311 U.S. 454 (1940); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925);
Davis v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915); Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665
(1914); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Dozier v. Alabama, 218
U.S. 124 (1910); Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906); Caldwell v.
North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902);

Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S.
141 (1889); Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888); Corson v. Maryland, 120
U.S. 502 (1887). Two cases involved corporation excise taxes levied on

foreign corporations engaged solely in making interstate sales. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Cheney Bros. Co, v.
Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918); cf. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue,
340 U.S. 534 (1951).
22. Heyman v. Hays, 236 U.S. 178 (1915); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Sims, 191
U.S. 441 (1903).
23. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906).
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an anomalous position in the eyes of the Court, however. If he carries goods with him for immediate delivery, he is in the category of
a "peddler" and as such he is engaged in a local business and becomes
subject to state or municipal taxes levied for the privilege of selling.24
Of course, taxes which discriminate against the "peddler" are invalid as a discrimination against interstate commerce. 25 If, however,
the itinerant salesman sells, either with or without sample, for
subsequent delivery from an out-of-state source of supply, he falls
in the category of a "drummer," and as such he is considered engaged
in interstate commerce; and his business of soliciting orders is exempt,
on commerce clause grounds, from state or municipal levies under the
26
firmly entrenched doctrine of the Robbins case.
While the "drummer" and "peddler" as such, may be figures of bygone days, their modern prototypes continue to exist under more
euphonious appellations. So, too, endure the distinctions in determining permissible and nonpermissible taxes on the occupation of
selling, when challenged on commerce clause grounds. The distinction has been preserved in determining the validity of taxes on various
privileges even in large corporate enterprises operating within the
taxing state for sale and subsequent interstate delivery of goods.
Consistent with the commerce clause, a tax can be levied on the sale
made by the extra-state seller which maintains in the taxing state a
sales establishment through which the particular order was handled,
even though delivery was made by interstate shipment to the purchaser from the out-of-state home office of the corporation. 27 However,
the existence of a local office in the taxing state is not sufficient to
allow the state to tax the sale where the order was sent by the
purchaser directly to the out-of-state office of the seller, 8 although a
use tax apparently would be proper under exactly the same circumstances and the out-of-state seller required to collect the tax of the
state of the buyer.29 Likewise, if a foreign corporation chooses to
remain at home in all respects, except to send abroad in other states
advertising or itinerant salesmen to solicit orders which are sent
directly to the home office of the selling foreign corporation where
they are accepted and filled, the state in which the purchaser is
located has no taxable grip on the out-of-state seller in so far as
24. Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941); Wagner v. City of
Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895).
25. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275 (1875); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).

26. See cases cited notes 21, 22 and 23 supra.
27. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Cheney
Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
28. In addition to cases cited in note 27 supra, see Sonneborn Bros. v.
Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515 (1923).

29. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roe-

buck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
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taxing the sale is concerned.30 Just as the salesman who solicited the
order was exempt from privilege taxes on the occupation of soliciting,
in like fashion the out-of-state corporation which fills the order cannot be reached by a sales tax, when resisted on commerce clause
grounds. But if a foreign corporation approaches a local market
to gain the advantage of a local business outlet, it loses its commerce
clause tax immunity as to all sales reasonably attributable to the
local business. 31 Thus, when the out-of-state corporation engages in
a local business, rather than the business of soliciting orders only,
it falls in the same category as the "peddler" and there is a sufficient
basis to support a tax by the buyer state, over commerce clause objections, on the corporation.
The law of sales has not generally been made the turning point
32
of valid and invalid taxes as applied to the occupation of selling.
Thus, the change of title is not determinative of the commerce clause
question. Here the court has insisted that "what is commerce among
the States is a question depending upon broader considerations than
the existence of a technically binding contract, or the time and
place where the title passed." 33 Even though the title to the goods
passes within the taxing state, the exemption from taxation is not removed where the sale results from an order solicited in the taxing
state and filled from an outside source of supply.3 4 Moreover, the
cloak of immunity is not removed even if the goods are delivered by
the salesman,3 5 or are held at an office in the taxing state for the
customer's disposal. 36
The conflicting policy considerations behind efforts to tax and
regulate itinerant salesmen are of considerable importance. Without
doubt, considerable stimulus to this type of legislation has been provided by local trade programs designed to promote local business.3 7
Outside competition may prove injurious to local merchants unable
30. See Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951);
cf. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
31. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Caskey
Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941); Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts,
246 U.S. 147 (1918); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914);
cf. Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 498 (1918).
32. See Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507, 512 (1906).

But cf. McLeod

v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (Court virtually let law of sales
(passage of title beyond taxing state) determine constitutional question).
33. Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U.S. 124, 128 (1910).

34. Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346 (1917); Norfolk &
W. Ry. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441 (1903); cf. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n

283 U.S. 465 (1931) (Court found that change of title or custody was noi
determinative of commerce clause question of tax in interstate transportation of oil).
35. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906) (goods delivered by
salesman who negotiated contract of sale in taxing state and filled order from
extra-state source of supply).
36. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894) (license tax on soliciting
agent of foreign manufacturer).
37. See Hemphill, The House to House Canvasserin Interstate Commerce, 60
Am. L. REv. 641, 642 (1926).
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to compete successfully with larger out-of-state concerns. Moreover, there is present a certain nuisance element in the house-tohouse doorbell-ringing canvasser. Likely, however, one of the major
factors that led to such legislation has been the dishonesty of many
solicitors and drummers, coupled with the opportunities for fraud
afforded by the transient nature of the business.3 Opposing these
reasons favoring the legislation are those considerations which the
commerce clause historically was designed to prevent, the erection of
trade barriers. 39 In many instances the license tax imposed on the
itinerant salesman appeared to be aimed at suppressing or placing
at a disadvantage the type of business handled by the itinerant
solicitor when brought into competition with local sales. This was
accomplished mainly by not requiring merchants having a fixed
place of business to pay the license tax. Or the statute may be
so camouflaged that the net effect of its practical operation is to impose a lighter tax on the local retail merchant, although nominally
the statute treats local and out-of-state transients alike.40
Most all of the taxing statutes or ordinances which have been struck
down when applied to itinerant salesmen, in practical operation,
seemed capable of use, by an increase of the tax, to make the cost
of distribution extremely burdensome or prohibitive. While a small
tax might not have that stifling effect, if the power to impose such
a tax exists, its amount might be increased so as to prohibit the
extra-state merchant's most effective method of obtaining a market.
Apparently, neither the commerce clause nor the due process clause
would place a limitation on the amount of an otherwise valid revenue
measure. 41 In short, when read in their proper setting, these license
taxes levied on itinerant salesmen were of a kind likely to be used
as an instrument of discrimination against interstate business. Basi38. Id. at 643.
39. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 445 (1849); 1

ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 106-18 (2d ed. 1836); 2 FARRAND, RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 308 (rev. ed. 1937); 3 id. at 478, 547-48;

Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 1m. L. REv. 432, 481-94 (1941).
40. See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
41. Although the authority is scarce as to the commerce clause aspects,
it appears that neither the commerce nor the due process clause would limit
the amount of an otherwise valid tax. See the dissent of Justices Stone,
Brandeis and Cardozo in Great No. Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 157 (1936); see
also Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 250 (1929). The cases
seem to make it clear that the due process clause would not make such a
limitation. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); Alaska Fish Co.
v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921); see Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310
U.S. 362, 370-71 (1940). In the case of taxes for the use of public facilities,
such as highways, the amount of the exaction is limited by the commerce
clause to an amount reasonably necessary to defray the cost of the purpose
for which it is levied. E.g., Ingles v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937). Such exactions
are not true revenue measures, but are in the nature of a rental charge for the
use of the public facility. See Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S.
183? 190 (1931). For a fuller discussion of exactions for the use of public
facilities, see HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 122 (1953).
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cally, the discriminating features of these taxes are what ought to
call for commerce clause condemnation. If no discrimination is present, it seems unfair to give interstate commerce this tax advantage
over the local business which must be saddled with the tax.
III. SALES AND USE TAXES
A. Sales Taxes Incident to InterstateSales
The term "sales tax" as used in this section of our discussion of
Csales taxation" refers generally to the retail sales tax and the
general sales tax as classified in the opening paragraphs of this
article on "Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce." Some sales
taxes apply to the sale of a commodity each time it changes hands;
these are often called turnover, or transaction, taxes. Sales of the
single-stage type apply to the sale of a commodity only once as it
passes through production and distribution channels and into the
hands of consumers. The single-stage sales tax is a kind of general
excise which can be imposed on any stage of the production process.
Ordinarily it is levied at one of three stages of production and distribution. It may be applied either at the manufacturing, the wholesaling or the retailing stage. This section of our discussion of "sales
taxation" will not include, except incidentally by way of reference,
those taxes levied on gross receipts or gross income of the taxpayer at an annual or some other stated period, and formally called
gross receipts or gross income taxes. Those will be considered in a
later section of this article.
Prior to 1940 it had been taken for granted that interstate sales
enjoyed a great deal of freedom from sales taxes. The Court had,
however, narrowed considerably the scope of the tax immunity of
such transactions, presumably with an eye to preserving a source
of state revenue and perhaps also to lessen the competitive handicap
of local merchants who must shoulder such taxes.
The Court had made it clear that the parties, by contractual manipulations, could not convert an otherwise local sales transaction into an
interstate sale, at least where the contract achieved nothing else.
Thus, where the goods that were the subject of the taxed sale were
in the hands of the purchaser to do with as he liked, the fact that the
parties by their contract fixed the place for the passage of title in
another state could not convert the local sale, subject to state
control, into an interstate transaction protected by the commerce
41
clause from taxation. a
Likewise, the Court had refused immunity from sales taxes where
the sales contract did not necessarily require nor contemplate ship41a. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390 (1930).
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ment from a point outside the taxing state, although the shipment
was in fact so made to fill the contract. That was the teaching of
Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania.42 The Wiloil opinion also reveals some
practical considerations which the Court took into account in sustaining the tax. The Court significantly points out that tax immunity
would cause inequality of tax burden between competing products,
and therefore between competing merchants, to the prejudice of
local business in the taxing state. The Wiloil opinion also observes
that since the burden of the tax on interstate commerce was equal to
that on local business, therefore, no discrimination against interstate
commerce could result.
The Court had also refused sales tax immunity in dealership transactions where the source of supply was beyond the borders of the
taxing state but the dealer and customer were located within its
borders. Banker Brothers Co. v. Pennsylvania3 set the pattern here.
The Court analyzed the Banker Brothers automobile dealership transaction as two separate sales, one interstate from the out-of-state
manufacturer to the in-state dealer, the other-the taxed one-from
the dealer to the customer, both of whom were within the taxing state.
Characterizing this typical sales transaction as an "intrastate contract of sale" rather than an interstate transaction, the Court upheld
the tax.
The Wiloil and Banker Brothers doctrines substanially limited the
42. 294 U.S. 169 (1935). The extent to which the Wiloil doctrine might be
carried, however, is difficult to predict. Is taxability dependent upon whether
the contract contemplated interstate shipment, or must the contract require
an interstate journey in order to fall within the Wiloil doctrine? Suppose the
seller manufacturing goods outside the taxing jurisdiction has neither warehouse nor property of the type sold within the taxing state. A shipment from
the extra-state source is contemplated; but, in the absence of some further
showing of necessity for making an interstate shipment, is the taxing power of
the state impaired under the Wiloil doctrine? The seller might purchase the
goods from some third person within the taxing state. The reductio ad
absurdum actually is reached if one imagines a case where no goods of the
type ordered are yet in existence. Can it be that the mere possibility of
making these articles within the state, although the factory is located outside, brings the situation within the Wiloil principle? No language by the
Court in any subsequent case suggests any such narrowing of the commerce
clause protection from taxation. See Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use
Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 CoLum. L. Rv. 49, 59 (1938).
43. 222 U.S. 210 (1911). In this case Banker Brothers of Pittsburgh sold
automobiles manufactured by Pierce Company of Buffalo, New York, keeping no stock of cars on hand. A purchaser signed a contract with Banker
Brothers in which he agreed to buy a car, paying the freight from Buffalo
and receiving in turn a warranty directly from the Buffalo manufacturer.
Purchaser made a down payment and the balance was due when the car
was delivered. Banker Brothers accepted a draft drawn by the manufacturer
and received a bill of lading pursuant to which it took delivery of the car
which had been shipped from Buffalo and had been delivered to Pennsylvania. Thereupon the dealer made delivery to the purchaser. The taxpayer
contended that there was only one sale, with the dealer acting merely as the
agent for the manufacturer. For a most careful and enlightening discussion
of the Wiloil and Banker Brothers cases in the total picture of sales taxes
in interstate commerce, see Lockhart, Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52
HARV. L. REV.617 (1939).
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sweeping doctrinal declarations of the Robbins case which had declared:
"Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same
amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce.... The negotiations
of sales of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate

commerce." 44
Both the Wiloil and Banker Brothers situations clearly involved "negotiations of the sale of goods which are in another state, for the
purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation
is made"; yet the tax was upheld in both cases.
For an interlude of our constitutional history the "original package
doctrine" found judicial acceptance as a prohibition against sales
taxes. 45 Eventually, however, the court discarded the "original package" doctrine as an aid for determining whether goods transported
46
interstate had lost their immunity from sales taxes.
But with an interstate sales transaction thus confined to these
narrower limits for commerce clause protection, freedom from any
form of sales taxation of such transactions was taken for granted.
As we have just seen, the Robbins case and its successors in kind
had insulated from taxation the occupation of making such a sale.
Moreover, a tax by the state of the seller upon the proceeds of sales
made by a seller to an out-of-state purchaser had been expressly
relegated to the limbo of a "direct burden" on interstate commerce.
This was the teaching of Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania.47 Although
foreign commerce was involved in Crew Levick, the Court seemed
to take pains to make it clear that the same result would follow in
interstate commerce.48 While there was no case squarely in point
with respect to the power of the buyer state to impose a sales tax,
it had been taken for granted by the Supreme Court that such a
tax would be a violation of the commerce clause.49 Presumably it was
on the assumption that an interstate sales transaction enjoyed tax
immunity, that caused the states to develop the use taxes, which are
44. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887).
45. This doctrine had its birth in the development of a limitation on the
power of the states to tax imports, where there is an express constitutional
prohibition against state taxation of imports. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). Nevertheless the doctrine carried over to some
extent into the field of interstate commerce. It did not find acceptance at
first, however. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868); Brown v.
Houston 114 U.S. 622 (1885). For a period of time it did receive judicial approval as a limitation on taxation of interstate commerce. E.g., Texas Co.
v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642
(1921).
46. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923). In the field of imports, the "original package" doctrine still has vitality as a limitation on
state taxing power. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
47. 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
48. See 245 U.S. at 296.
49. See Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515 (1923).
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used to make a compensating levy on goods brought into the state as
a result of an interstate sales transaction or an out-of-state purchase.
These use taxes we will examine in detail presently.
Not only was a sales tax incident to an interstate sale considered
prohibited; but, as we will see more in detail a little later, relatively
unsuccessful too had been attempts to reach an interstate sale
through a tax levied upon gross proceeds, which included receipts derived from an interstate sale. When a sales tax went before the
Court in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. 50 in 1940,
prospects for a valid tax did not look encouraging. Just two years
earlier in J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen5' the Court had
nullified an Indiana gross receipts tax as applied to the receipts of
a local manufacturer of road machinery derived from interstate sales.
Since there was no apportionment of the Adams tax, it was thought
by the Court to threaten a double tax burden not borne by local
commerce, on the theory that if Indiana's (the taxing state) were
sustained, a similar tax could also be imposed by the buyer's state.
Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority, states the matter as

follows:
"The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is
that the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts
derived from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction
is of such a character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the
fullest extent by States in which the goods are sold as well! as those
in which they are manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be
subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed." 52

This language seemed to forbode evil days for the sales tax called
into question in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. This
case involved the application of the sales tax levied by New York
City to sales of coal by a coal company to local customers under contracts made in New York but calling for shipment and delivery direct
from mines in Pennsylvania. The tax was fixed at "two percentum
of the receipts from every sale in the City of New York." Sale was
defined by the act as "any transfer of title or possession, or both...
in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration or
any agreement therefor." The law also provided that the tax "shall
be paid by the purchaser to the vendor, for or on account of the
City of New York." The vendor, who was authorized to collect the
tax, was required to charge it to the purchaser, separately from the
sales price; and the vendor was made liable, as an insurer, for the
50. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
For an exhaustive treatment of this case, see Powell, New Light on Gross
Receipts Taxes, 53 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1940).
51. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
52. 304 U.S. at 311.
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payment of the tax to the city. In the event of the nonpayment of the
tax to the vendor, the buyer was required, within fifteen days after
his purchase, to file a tax return and to pay the tax to the Comptroller,
who was authorized to set up a procedure for collection of the tax
from the purchaser. Purchases for resale were exempt from the tax.
The transaction involved in this case clearly was an interstate
sales transaction even as narrowed by the Banker Brothers5 3 and Wiloil cases. 54 There seemed little practical distinction between the
New York sales tax, which was measured by the gross receipts of
the sale, and the tax levied directly on gross receipts from sales which
was condemned in the Adams case. It would seem that the unapportioned Berwind-White tax, like the Adams tax, as applied to
receipts from interstate sales included "in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived from activities in interstate commerce;
and that the exaction is of such a character that if lawful it may in
substance be laid to the fullest extent by States in which the goods
were sold as well as those in which they are manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk of a double tax
burden." 55 This was the vice of the Adams tax. If the buyer's state
(here New York) could reach the gross receipts by a sales tax, presumably the seller state could do likewise.
The Berwind-White case tax was, nevertheless, sustained by a
divided Court. Justice Stone, speaking for the majority, reasoned that
interstafe commerce should pay its fair share of the tax burden;
that the tax was not discriminatory against interstate commerce,
and it was imposed on a "local activity," distinct from commerce.
"Its [the tax] only relation to the commerce arises from the fact that
immediately preceding transfer of possession to the purchaser within
the state, which is the taxable event regardless of the time and place
of passing title, the merchandise has been transported in interstate
commerce and brought to its journey's end." 56 As to the economic
effect of the tax on interstate commerce, Justice Stone concluded that
it had "no different effect upon interstate commerce than a tax on the
'use' of property which has just been moved in interstate commerce
... or the tax on storage or withdrawal for use by the consignee of
gasoline . . . or the familiar property tax on goods by 57the state of
destination at the conclusion of their interstate journey."
In the Berwind-White opinion, Justice Stone explained that the
Adams tax, which was measured by the total gross receipts from
53. Banker Bros. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210 (1911). See note 43 supra,
and textual material supported by note 43 supra, for discussion of case.
54. Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935). See note 42 supra,
and textual material supported by note 42 supra, for discussion of case.
55. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
56. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 49 (1940).
57. Ibid.
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interstate commerce, included proceeds derived from extra-state activities in interstate commerce, as distinguished from the receipts
from wholly local activities58 On the other hand, the "transfer of
possession to the purchaser," which was held to be the "taxable
event" in the Berwind-White case, was said to be a wholly local
activity which could not be taxed elsewhere. The economic incidence
of the Berwind-White case, would seem to be the same as the Adams
tax since neither of them was apportioned.
The Berwind-White dissent, led by Chief Justice Hughes, spearheaded an attack against the tax on the ground that the majority permitted other states to reach what is essentially the same transaction.
The Chief Justice pointed out that delivery (the taxable event),
unlike, subsequent use or sale, is an integral part of the interstate
transaction. If New York can lay a tax on the local act of delivery, it seems just as logical, argued the Chief Justice, that Pennsylvania can impose a tax on the local act of shipment, and New Jersey
the transshipment, likewise integral parts of the interstate transaction.
Hence commerce between the states is exposed to the danger of a
"multiple tax" burden much like the theory of the Adams case, before Justice Stone had interpreted it in the Berwind-White opinion.
The full possible implications of the Berwind-White decision could
have been far-reaching but subsequent cases seem to have limited
the decision considerably. Berwind-White, without doubt, at that
time, further committed the Court to the proposition that interstate
commerce should "pay its way." While the Court was concerned
with avoiding "cumulative tax burdens" on interstate commerce that
would place the commerce at a competitive disadvantage with local
business, it seemed to have modified that doctrine as developed in
the Adams59 and Gwin, White60 cases. It did so in Berwind-White by
holding that the "transfer of possession" at the end of interstate transportation is a taxable local event, separate and distinct from the commerce itself, thus permitting the seller state (New York) to tax the
interstate sale in full. Whereas, the taxes levied on the proceeds
of the sale by the state of the seller in the interstate sales transactions in the Adams and Gwin, White cases were thought by
the Court to be imposed on interstate commerce itself; and, since
they were not apportioned, the Court felt that they exposed that
commerce to the risk of a double tax burden not borne by local busi-.
ness. While the "local activity" concept had been used to prevent tax
nullification prior to the Berwind-White era, never before that era
had such an integral part of an interstate transaction been considered
a taxable, local event as that in Berwind-White.
58. See id. at 57-58.
59. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co, v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
60. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
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To avoid unfair treatment to interstate commerce by a tax on the
proceeds from an interstate sales transaction, it might be necessary
either to apportion the tax or to deny the seller state the power to
tax the sales transaction at all. Of course, local sales could conceivably be taxed in full both on the seller's end and the buyer's
end; and in that manner a tax in full at both ends of the interstate
sale would be the same kind of treatment as that accorded local
business. Permitting the interstate sale to be taxed in full by the
state of the buyer, even though the seller state is denied the power,
does have merit. In the state of the buyer is where the goods would
enter competition with goods sold locally and which would be subject
to the same sales tax. Thus, the tax burden would necessarily fall
equally on both interstate and local trade. The competitive situation
would remain the same as if no sales tax were imposed, because the
tax burden upon interstate and local sales would be the same. Neither
interstate nor local business would suffer any competitive disadvantage resulting from a heavier tax burden. The state of the seller
has all the productive processes from which it can get its revenue.
Thus, it would not be left impecunious. Too, allowing only the buyer
state to tax in full would avoid any cumbersome attempts at apportionment of the proceeds of the sale between the buyer and the
seller state, as suggested in the Adams case, as necessary where interstate sales are involved. It involves, however, a pure policy decision by the Court. But then the Court made a policy decision in
the first instance where it declared interstate commerce cannot be
61
taxed at all.

During the same term of Court and on the authority of the BerwindWhite case the New York City sales tax was upheld in three com.panion cases. 62 In McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
and Jagels, A Fuel Corporationv. Taylor, the corporate and other
relevant facts were essentially like those in the Berwind-White case,
with the exception that in the Jagels case the sales contracts were
concluded outside the taxing city. In McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant
Mfg. Co., decided concurrently with Berwind-White, there were
differences that seem to be substantial. The taxpayer, Du Grenier,

in the Felt & Tarrant case, had no place of business in the taxing
municipality, and accepted orders outside the taxing city. The
61. Justice Rutledge did some thinking along these lines in his vigorous
dissent in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 335 (1944). Other
authorities in this field have pointed out the merits of this approach. See
Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HA.v. L. REv. 710, 739-41
(1947); Lockhart, Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HAnv. L. Rnv. 617,
625 (1939).
62. McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantiue, 309 U.S. 430 (1940);
Jagels, "A Fuel Corporation" v. Taylor, 255 App. Div. 965, 8 N.Y.S.2d 456
(Ist Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 766, 21 N.E.2d 526 (1939), aff'd per curiam,
309 U.S. 619 (1940); McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70
(1940).
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goods were then shipped into the taxing city, f.o.b. the place
of shipment. Without even mentioning these differences, the Court,
in the Felt & Tarrant case, said that, like the Berwind-White 'case, the
"transfer of possession" took place in the taxing jurisdiction. Upon
this basis the Court sustained the tax. Presumably, the Court meant
that the transfer of the goods from the carrier to the buyer within
the taxing jurisdiction was the "transfer of possession" sufficient to
constitute a taxable event.
The same basic constitutional considerations would seem to apply
where the sales tax is imposed on each isolated transaction as it
transpires (Berwind-White and its companion decisions), as would
apply where the pioceeds from a sales transaction are included in
gross receipts upon which a tax is imposed annually or at some other
stated period. The Court emphatically so declared in the case of
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury,63 which sustained, over commerce clause objections, a tax on gross receipts, including receipts from sales followed by interstate trdnsportation, as
well as receipts from another sales transaction at the end of an interstate journey. The Court relied upon Berwind-White as authority for
upholding the tax imposed on each end of the interstate journey, the
Court declaring that there is the same practical equivalence whether
the tax is on the selling or on the buying phase of the transaction.
Each was said to be, in substance, an imposition of a tax on the
transfer of property. Too, the Court let it be known that there is no
constitutional difference whether the tax utilized is one laid on
gross receipts or whether it is a sales tax imposed on each isolated
sales transaction. Substance, not dialectics, said the Court, in its
enthusiasm of the moment, is what matters.
On the same day the Court decided this International Harvester
case, it also decided McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.,64 which is a source
of considerable confusion and difficulties. This case involved an
Arkansas retail sales tax. The complaining taxpayers were Tennessee corporations, which had not qualified to do business in Arkansas
and had no place of business there. Orders were solicited in Arkansas
by traveling salesmen, or by mail or by telephone. After the Tennessee seller had accepted the orders, shipments were made from
Tennessee direct to purchasers in Arkansas where possession was
transferred from the carrier to the purchaser. Title passed in Tennessee on delivery to the carrier. In a five to four decision the Court
held that the Arkansas sales tax applied to these transactions would
be repugnant to the commerce clause. Since title had passed in Tennessee, "the Tennessee seller was through selling in Tennessee." Since
63. 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
64. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
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the sale occurred in Tennessee, the majority said Arkansas had no
constitutional power to apply a sales tax to the transaction.
In explaining why the state where the produce would be marketed
and consumed could not impose the Dilworth sales tax, although it
is virtually certain that it could have levied a use tax, the majority
was forced to draw a distinction between a sales and a use tax. A
sales tax was said to be a tax on the freedom of purchase, while a
use tax is imposed on the enjoyment of that which is purchased. This
five man Dilworth majority seemed impervious to the fact that on
the same day as the Dilworth decision the Court in International
Harvester had called the two taxes the same in substance and the
same in their effect on interstate commerce. Too, on the same day
as the Dilworth tax demise, the General Trading case had upheld an
Iowa use tax on facts essentially similar in corporate and commercial
aspects to the Dilworth case facts.
The Court allegedly felt that since the Arkansas Court had construed the tax to be a sales tax, it could not hold that the incidence of
the tax was such that it fell in the same constitutional category as a
use tax. It felt that it could not look behind the label and give the tax
a construction that would sustain it. It is a bit strange to have the
Dilworth Court declare that the Arkansas court's construction of
the tax is "controlling," in light of another of its decisions at the
same term of Court as the Dilworth case. In International Harvester
Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation,6 5 the Supreme Court not
only ignored the label which the state court had pinned on a tax
in striking it down, but reversed the state court and sustained the
tax. The Court was concerned with the constitutional power of a
state, it said in the InternationalHarvester case, and not with labels
which the state courts used to characterize the tax. The same thing
had occurred just three years earlier in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co,,66
where the Court ignored the pigeon-hole into which the state court
had placed the tax and sustained it.
In the Berwind-White decision and its companion cases, the Wood
Preserving67 decision and the International Harvester6 holding, the
"delivery of possession" of the goods within the taxing state was
said to be a taxable event for the sales tax, which was the same sort
of tax as that in the Dilworth case. It is clear that there was also
a "delivery of possession" in the taxing state to the Dilworth purchaser. The Dilworth majority distinguished the Berwind-White case
65. 322 U.S. 435 (1944).

66. 311 U.S. 435 (1940). Apparently the latest instance where the Court
refused to be bound by the label placed on the tax by the highest court of
the state is Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
67. Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
68. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340
(1944).
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on the ground that the Berwind-White seller had a sales office in
the taxing state, made the sales contract in the taxing state and also
made delivery there.6 9 These were not regarded as the taxable events
when Berwind-White was handed down, as shown by the validation
0
of the tax in its companion case of McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant.7
There the taxpayer, Du Grenier, had no place of business in the taxing
state and accepted all orders outside the taxing state. Delivery of
possession alone was the event that supported the tax in the Felt &
Tarrant case. Moreover, Justice Stone expressly declared in his
Berwind-White opinion that "transfer of possession" constituted the
1
taxable event.7
The Dilworth case seems to conflict squarely with the McGoldrick
v. Felt & Tarrant case, which also upheld the New York City sales
tax. In both the Dilworth and the Felt & Tarrant cases, the taxpayer
had no established place of business in the taxing state; in both cases
orders were solicited in the taxing state by agents, forwarded to
out-of-state sellers for approval, and the goods were shipped f.o.b.
points outside the taxing state to the purchasers in the taxing state.
In every essential commercial and corporate respect the two cases
appear to be virtually identical. The Dilworth case thrust down the
tax; Felt & Tarrant held the tax constitutionally impeccable.
However, Dilworth did not expressly overrule Felt & Tarrant,
although both cases seem to involve precisely the same essential
facts. Notwithstanding the clear inconsistency of these two cases,
the Court in the International Harvester case, decided on the same
day as Dilworth, cited Felt & Tarrant as good authority. The Court
thus got itself into the anomalous and perhaps unprecedented predicament of impliedly overruling a case and also expressly following it
on the same day.
Moreover, when Mr. Justice Frankfurter makes constitutional power
turn on the passage of title in the Dilworth case, he is doing what had
previously been condemned as unsound constitutional doctrine. The
question whether title passes in the state of origin of the gdods or in
the state of destination had not been thought a controlling factor under
the commerce clause prior to the advent of Dilworth. Justice Holmes
had thought that "commerce among the several States is a practical
''
conception, not drawn from the 'witty diversities' of the law of sales. Ma
Following Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Dilworth teachings, it would seem
possible for parties by contractual manipulation to rig what would
otherwise be an exclusively local activity into an interstate trans69. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1944).
70. 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
71. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 49 (1940).
71a. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comn'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931); Rearick v.
Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507, 512 (1906). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Misissippi
ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390 (1930).
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action, so that it could enjoy whatever tax immunity the commerce
clause can confer.
In deciding the validity of the Dilworth tax, the Court gave no attention to the practical considerations which had found their way into
a few of the earlier cases. It gave no recognition to the essential fairness that those engaged in interstate commerce should bear their fair
share of the cost of the local government where they operate and
whose protection they enjoy. Moreover, the economic effect of the tax
ostensibly was not thought to be a factor in determining its validity.
Nor did the Court concern itself with the fact that tax immunity
in the Dilworth transaction would cause inequality of tax burden
between competing products to the prejudice of the local business in
the taxing state. Nor was the Court impressed by the fact that
there was no discrimination against the interstate business there involved, since the burden of the tax on the Dilworth business was
exactly the same as that on the local business which was saddled with
the tax. When a sales tax is levied by the buyer's state, is it too
much to suggest that the commerce clause issue ought to be whether
the buyer state is treating all purchases -made therein alike? Instead,
the commerce clause, as applied in the Dilworth case, compelled the
buyer state to accord a discriminatory favor to purchasers of commodities that come from other states.
The Dilworth decision, while adverse to the taxing power of the
states, fortunately did not cripple the states with respect to interstate
sales as a source of revenue. Arkansas and states similarly situated
can resort to the Iowa use tax statute, which was sustained in General Trading,72 as a guide and mow a swathe to the extent their
collecting staff can harvest. General Trading sustained a use tax
exaction under facts similar in all material respects to the Dilworth
facts.
It is thus apparent that if the questioned tax is styled a sales tax,
the scope of state power is much more restricted than if the levy
is labelled a use tax, which is levied upon the buyer but with its impact3
upon the seller who often must serve as collector of the use tax.7
B. Sales and Use Taxes as Applied to Articles
Used in InterstateCommerce
Several efforts have been made to apply sales and use taxes to
articles used in interstate commerce. This has been especially the
72. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
73. In characterizing the tax case opinions of this period, Professor Powell
has declared that "names were made to matter more than mathematics or
economics." See Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARV.
L. REv. 501, 503 (1947). The collection aspects of the use tax will be examined
in detail a bit later. See the sub-division "The Use Tax Collecting Device and
the Constitutional Question," infra.
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situation with respect to gasoline when used to propel water craft,
trains, busses and planes which are instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
In Helson and Randolph v. Kenucky 74 the Court faced for the first
time the problem of the validity of use taxes as applied to articles
used in interstate commerce. There Kentucky levied a tax upon all
gasoline used or sold within the state. The objecting taxpayer was
a citizen and resident of Illinois where it had its place of business.
Taxpayer did an exclusively interstate ferry business and the gasoline
used to create the motive power of the ferry was purchased outside
Kentucky, although seventy-five per cent of it was actually consumed
within the borders of Kentucky. The effort of Kentucky to apply her
tax to the gasoline used by the ferry business was thwarted by the
Court. Using familiar doctrinal declarations, the Court condemned
the use tax as a "direct burden" upon the "privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce." The Court said:
"The tax is exacted as the price of the privilege of using an instrumentality
of interstate commerce.... A tax, which falls directly upon the use of
one of the means by which commerce is carried on, directly burdens that
commerce. If a tax cannot be laid by a state upon the interstate transportation of the subjects of commerce, as this Court definitely has held,
it is little more than repetition to say that such a tax cannot be laid
upon the use of a medium by which such transportation is effected." 75
Not long after the Helson case, a New Mexico statute, which required
a common carrier engaged exclusively in interstate transportation, to
pay an excise tax upon the use of motor fuel brought in from another
state and used only in transportation in the taxing state, was questioned in Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western LinesJ6 The objecting
taxpayer's busses were powered entirely by gasoline purchased without the state. On the authority of the Helson case the Court upset the
tax as applied.
Under the Helson doctrine there seems to be but little opportunity
for a state to raise revenue by imposing a use tax upon the use of
supplies and equipment while actually employed in interstate com77
merce.
Following the' immunity from use taxes granted by the Helson
doctrine, an escape from sales taxes on articles to be used in interstate
commerce was attempted in Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South
74. 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
75. See 279 U.S. at 252.
76. 297 U.S. 626 (1936).

77. In addition to the Helson and Bingaman cases, cf. Cooney v. Mountain
States Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935) (Court struck down a state excise tax
on each telephone used, in part, in interstate commerce). The exaction was
applied indiscriminately without apportionment to an instrumentality common
to interstate and local business. One writer has questioned whether the
Helson doctrine is still the law. See Brown, The Future of Use Taxes, 8
LAW &CONTEM. PROB. 495, 496 (1932).
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Carolina Tax Commission.78 The Court refused, however, to expand
the zone of tax immunity in this field. In the Eastern Air Transport
case South Carolina had imposed on all dealers in gasoline a license
tax measured by the number ol gallons of gasoline sold in the state.
The complaining taxpayer operated planes only in interstate commerce. Purchases of gasoline were made in the taxing state for use
of its planes and the seller added the amount of the tax to the
price which the seller had to pay. In refusing an injunction against
the collection of the tax as an alleged violation of the commerce clause,
the Court sustained the validity of the tax as applied to the taxpaying
carrier, although engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. The
"mere purchase of supplies or equipment for use in conducting interstate commerce is not so identified with that commerce as to make the
sale immune from a non-discriminatory tax imposed by the State
upon intrastate dealers," said the Court.
The Court found no difficulty in distinguishing the sales tax involved in the Eastern Transport case from the use tax struck down
in the Helson case, on the ground that a use tax is "manifestly different
from ... a tax upon purely local sales." This difference is that the
sales tax occurred at a stage more remote from interstate transit than
the use tax, which was thought to be directly upon that commerce.
From a time or geographical standpoint the sales tax on this article
used to carry on interstate commerce is not so identified with the
subsequent interstate commerce as is the use tax on articles employed
in interstate commerce. But from an economic viewpoint, the two
taxes would seem to be an equal burden upon interstate commerce.
The net effect of both types of tax would seem to produce the same
overall decrease, if any, in the volume of interstate business, since
the sales tax was here clearly passed on to the taxpayer engaged
in interstate commerce. It is difficult to see how the condemned
Helson use tax could have any greater propensities to hamper or
hinder interstate trade than would the sanctioned Eastern Air Transport sales tax. But then the Court has attached but little significance
to economic effects of the tax in determining whether the tax is
permissible or not permissible. 79 Use tax litigation has furnished no
exception to the rule that the Court has been chiefly concerned with
activities having some physical connection with interstate movement
in determining the validity of a tax. The tests resorted to by the
78. 285 U.S. 147 (1932).
79. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 177-78 (1939); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S- 203, 217 (1925). It would
neither be correct nor fair to say that the Court has never given consideration
to the economic consequences of the tax in deciding its validity. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 49 (1940); Wiloil Corp.
v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935); United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek,
247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918).
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Court are thus mechanical.8 0 Economic similarity as an exclusive
test would, of course, make pertinent precedents out of many cases
otherwise in conflict with each other. In no other instance is that
better shown than in the cases involving sales and use taxes as
applied to articles and instrumentalities used in interstate commerce.

C. Use, Storage and Withdrawal Taxes on Articles
Transportedin Interstate Commerce
When the Court struck down the use tax as applied to the actual
consumption of gasoline by a vehicle doing an interstate business in
the Helson8' case, it became clear that the use tax had definite limitations as a revenue raising measure. Storage and withdrawal for use
taxes were attempted, apparently in an effort partially to get around
the effects of Helson.
Storage or withdrawal taxes may be imposed at three different
stages-before the articles start their interstate movement, after the
movement ends, or during an interruption or break of the interstate
movement. The use tax generally is levied after the articles have
completed an interstate trip, but this tax may be imposed, like
storage and withdrawal taxes, between two segments of an interstate
journey.
In determining whether a use, storage or withdrawal tax as applied
to articles transported in interstate commerce is a forbidden burden,
the Court has been primarily concerned, as it has been with other taxes,
with whether the event upon which the tax was laid has some physical
connection with interstate movement. Little significance, if any, has
been attached to the economic burden of the tax.
The Court early evolved the doctrine that articles ceased to be
subject to state taxation when the goods started on a final journey out
of the state; 82 and conversely, when the interstate movement had
not begun, the mere fact that such movement was contemplated did
80. The Court, at times, makes a forthright recognition of the mechanical
nature of the test. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360 (1943). Justice
Stone's Di Santo dissent also pointed this out. See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,
273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
81. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929). See textual
treatment supported by notes 74-78 supra, for development of doctrine.
82. In Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 525 (1886), the Court pointed out that
the dividing line between a taxable and a non-taxable activity should be dependent upon whether interstate movement had started. For cases holding
that goods are non-taxable while in interstate movement, see Hughes Bros.
Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926); Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922); Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232
(1872). For a late case where the same principle was invoked where gas
was shipped interstate, see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347
U.S. 157 (1954).
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not withdraw the property from the state's power to tax it.83 Even
practical continuity of production and interstate movement has not
always made an activity a part of interstate commerce for tax protection purposes.8 4 The fact that articles intended for movement
in interstate channels have work done on them, which adapts them
to the needs of commerce, has not immunized from various forms
of local taxation either the articles themselves or those who produced
or prepared them for a trip beyond the borders of the state. 85 So,
by analogy, storage of goods before their movement in interstate commerce begins has not exempted the goods from a storage tax, although an interstate movement was contemplated. A non-discriminatory tax upon the business of storing goods which have not yet
begun their interstate journey has been sanctioned, although the
goods were awaiting shipment beyond the borders of the taxing state. 86
The burden of the storage tax was said to be too indirect and re87
mote to transgress constitutional limitations in such instances.
In like fashion, articles that have been transported interstate, after
the termination of their interstate journey, no longer remain subjects of interstate commerce and they may constitutionally be made
the subject of use or other enjoyment taxes. 88 The tax is considered
an excise laid upon the privilege of local use of the goods which
have passed beyond interstate commerce and have lost their interstate character.
Some elaboration on the idea of moving in interstate commerce, as
a criterion for determining the validity of storage and use taxes, is
needed where the movement is checked or interrupted. In short, what
is the status taxwise of goods which are thus halted between two
segments of interstate commerce? This facet of use and storage taxes
has an added constitutional feature where articles have been transported interstate, and stored, awaiting use or consumption in an
interstate business, where the use tax could not be applied because
of the Helson89 doctrine.
83. Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934) (tax on buying and
selling cotton to go into out-of-state commercial channels); Federal Compress
& Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) (tax on storing and compressing cotton which had not yet begun to move in intended interstate commerce);
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (tax on ore to be sent
out of the taxing state) .
84. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (tax on generation
of electricity where the production and transmission of electricity were instantaneous and simultaneous); cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S.
167 (1939).
85. E.g., Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260
U.S. 245 (1922); cf. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
86. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934).
87. See id. at 22.
88. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934); cf. J. Bacon & Sons
v. Martin, 305 U.S. 380 (1939) (tax on the "receipts" of goods construed and
sustained as a tax on sale and use of goods after retailer had received them).
89. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
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As we have seen, a state may not tax property in transit in interstate commerce, 90 and until 1940 it was thought that an interstate sales
transaction was likewise entitled to the same tax immunity.91 Couple
with those two principles the doctrine of the Helson case, which
exempted from taxation the use of articles used in interstate commerce, and there existed the possibilities of large scale tax avoidance
by rigging purchases of goods so as to constitute interstate sales.
That is what large users of articles did. After the articles were delivered in the buyer's state through an interstate sale, they would be
stored and withdrawn as needed for use in interstate commerce. In
this way the users of the articles enjoyed freedom from a great deal
of state taxation.92 It was to thisi sort of practice that storage and
withdrawal taxes were directed, with a view to removing the tax
immunity from goods halted for storage purposes between two
segments of interstate commerce.
Storage and withdrawal taxes, as applied to articles transported
interstate for use or consumption in interstate commerce, seem to
have been called into judgment for the first time in 1933 in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace.9 3 There Tennessee
had levied a "privilege tax" on the storage of gasoline within the
state and its withdrawal from storage for sale or use. The tax was
assailed by the taxpaying railroad on commerce clause grounds, as
applied to gasoline brought into Tennessee by the taxpayer, stored,
withdrawn and used as a source of motive power for moving its interstate trains. The attack was spearheaded on the double ground that
it was imposed on the gasoline while still the subject of interstate
commerce in the course of transportation from points of origin outside the taxing state; and on the ground that it was, in effect, a tax
upon the use of gasoline in taxpayer's business as an interstate
carrier.
Over all the objections, the tax was sustained as a valid exercise
of the taxing power of the state. When the gasoline was "unloaded
and stored [it] ceased to be a subject of transportation in interstate
commerce and lost its immunity as such from state taxation."94 In
sustaining the tax, the Court relied heavily on the analogy to the
power of a state to levy personal property taxes on goods similarly
situated. While adhering to the doctrine that the states may not tax
property in transit in interstate commerce, the Court reasoned that
it is also well settled that, by reason of a break in the transit, the
90. See cases in note 82 supra.
91. See cases in notes 47-51 supra, and textual material supported by those
notes.
92. See Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce
Pays Its Way, 38 CoLum. L. REV. 49, 55 (1938).
93. 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
94. 288 U.S. at 266.
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property may come to rest within a state and become subject to the
power of the state to impose a non-discriminatory property tax.
Not all pauses in interstate movement will permit a property tax,
however. The crucial question in determining whether the state's
power may thus be exerted to tax personal property that has been
halted in its interstate journey, is dependent upon the purpose for
which the transit is broken. The decisions established the principle
that when property comes to rest within a state primarily because of
its owner's business reasons, and is subject to his complete power of
disposal either within or without the state as his interests dictate,
the property is deemed to be a part of the general mass of property
within the state and subject to the state's taxing power.95 On the
other hand, if the stoppage is a mere temporary interruption due to
the necessities of the journey or for the purpose of safety or con96
venience, the property remains immune from state taxation.
On the personal property tax analogy, the Court felt that the storage
tax in the Wallace case was levied on the privilege of storing gasoline
that-had become a part of the common mass of goods within the state
and subject to local taxation. The gasoline, upon being unloaded and
stored, ceased to be a subject of interstate commerce. When the
gasoline was shipped from points of origin outside the taxing state, no
destination for any part of it, other than the storage tanks of the taxpayer in the taxing state, had been arranged. Although in the usual
course of business a variable and undefined part of the gasoline would
be segregated and again would be transported across state borders,
the taxpayer was free to distribute it either within or without the
state for use in its business or for any other purpose. So reasoned the
Court.
In line with the then prevailing doctrinal declarations, the Court
was of tle opinion that the storage tax in the Wallace case would
only indirectly affect interstate commerce. The tax was, therefore, not
one imposed on the use of the gasoline as an instrument of commerce, where such tax was invalidated as a "direct burden" on interstate commerce in the Helson 97 case.
At the same term of Court as the Wallace decision, Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc.98 was decided. There the Court sustained a
use tax statute, substantially identical to the Wallace storage tax,
95. E.g., Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665 (1913); Bacon
v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504 (1913); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908);
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500 (1904); Diamond Match Co.
v. Ontonagon, 188 U.S. 82 (1903); see Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 10
(1933).
96. Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929); Hughes Bros. Timber
Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926); Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro,
260 U.S. 366 (1922); Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
97. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
98. 289 U.S. 249 (1933).
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as applied to an interstate air transport company. The Wallace case
statute was labelled a storage and withdrawal tax; the nomenclature
used in the statute upheld in the Edelmaan case was that of a use tax.
Both tax statutes were of the same nature and designed to reach
the same event.
The use tax, coupled together witl a storage tax in the same
statute, was upheld in two cases involving a California statute. These
cases are of some significance because they substantially narrowed
the scope of tax immunity given to articles used in interstate commerce. The first was Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher,99 which sustained the statute on storage and use as applied to railroad equipment and supplies purchased outside and brought into the state
for use in the operation of an interstate railroad. The Court found
a taxable moment when the articles "had reached the end of their
interstate transportation and had not begun to be consumed in
interstate operation." During this break, the privilege of "storage
and use-retention and exercise of a right of ownership respectivelywas effective" as a taxable event.
At the same term of Court, California's use and storage tax was
again sustained, over commerce clause objections, in Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher.0 0 There the questioned tax was applied to equipment, apparatus, materials and supplies purchased
outside and shipped into the state to be used in operation, maintenance
and repair of an interstate communications system. The tax was
validated on the authority of the Southern Pacific case. The Court
decided that the taxpaying communications company exercised two
rights of ownership in the taxing state-retention and installation
of the equipment-after the termination of the interstate shipment
and before the use or consumption in interstate commerce began. They
could properly serve as taxable events.
The Southern Pacific and the Pacific Telephone decisions expanded
to a considerable extent the taxing power of the state over the
99. 306 U.S. 167 (1939).
100. 306 U.S. 182 (1939). In Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele,
331 U.S. 70 (1947), a divided Court sustained a municipal ordinance which
required the payment of a license fee for carrying on the business of storing
personal property as applied to coal shipped from another state, stored in the
jurisdiction awaiting shipment by owner to its final destination, either to another state or to other points in the same state. Most of the coal was, in fact,
shipped out of the taxing jurisdiction to other states. The coal was stored
in the taxing jurisdiction because storage space in the state of destination
(New York) was so scarce and rates so prohibitive that it was stored elsewhere than in New York. The Court felt that the coal was stored primarily
for the owner's "business reasons" rather than "transit reasons." This reasoning is consistent with earlier opinions upholding taxes- where the tax was imposed during a break in an interstate journey for the "business reasons"
of the owner, rather than during a break for "transit reasons," where a tax
cannot be imposed. See notes 95-96 supra, and textual material supported by
those notes.
.I .
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Wallace case and the Edelman holding. In Wallace and Edelman
there had been a period of time during which the taxed materials
were in "storage" at the end of the interstate delivery. There was
thus a break of considerable duration in the interstate movement.
The taxable grip was on the storage and the withdrawal from storage
for use of these materials in interstate commerce. In the Southern
Pacific and Pacific Telephone decisions a part of the articles were
sent from outside the taxing state to the place of installation where
they immediately were put into interstate operation. The entire
interstate movement and installation were "as nearly continuous as
managerial efficiency can contrive."'101 The interval of taxable use
was thus reduced to the very brief period of actual installation.

D. CompensatingUse Taxes Incident to InterstateSales
1. Nature and Purpose of the Compensating Use Tax
Even though a state imposes a sales tax, its residents likely will
continue to make most of their minor purchases from local sources.
They are likely, however, to go bargain hunting outside the state to
a less tax-burdened market for their major purchases. The unfortunate result of such extra-state bargain hunting is not merely
a short-changing of the state's coffers, but local merchants whose
transactions are subject to the local sales tax may find themselves
at a competitive disadvantage with an extra-state seller who is
not burdened with any equivalent sales tax.10 2 The legislatures of
states having a sales tax have not been able to plug these economic
leaks by extending the reach of the sales tax. For one thing, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment would seem to be
an impediment to taxation of extra-territorial sales.1 03 Moreover,
as we have had occasion to see, prior to the 1940 decision of McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White,10 4 it was taken for granted that the state
of the purchaser was constitutionally powerless to impose a
sales tax on an interstate sales transaction. 105 These limitations on
the taxing power of the states enabled residents of states having a
sales tax to make their purchases tax-free, either by making the
purchase beyond the borders of their state or by arranging the
101. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 173 (1939).
102. For authorities recognizing these infirmities in the sales tax structure,
see Carlson, Interstate Barrier Effects of the Use Tax, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 223-25 (1941); Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate
Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 COLum. L. REv. 49, 64 nn. 65-70 (1938).
103. See Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 7 Mss. L. J. 223,
228-29 (1935). For a relatively late commerce clause obstacle to such tax,
see McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
104. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
105. See notes 53-55 supra, and textual material supported by those notes.
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transaction so as to constitute an interstate sale. It was to this sort
of bargain hunting, hurtful both to local business and state revenue
raisers, that the compensating use tax was directed.
Compensating use tax statutes take the form of a levy on the local

privilege of using property within the taxing state, which would have
been subject to a sales tax had the property been purchased within
the taxing state. The compensating use tax rate is the same as the
local sales tax levy, and provision is made that no article on which
a sales or use tax has once been paid shall again be subject to the
use tax. The compensating use tax is thus geared as complementary
to the local sales tax.
2. DiscriminatoryAspects of the Compensating Use Tax
Apparently one of the purposes, and certainly one of the results, of
the compensating use tax is to help the retail sellers in the taxing state
to compete upon terms of equality with retail dealers in other states
who are exempt from a sales tax or any corresponding tax burden.
Another ostensible purpose, and certainly another tendency of the
use tax, is to avoid the likelihood of a drain upon the revenue of
the state by removing from buyers the temptation to place their orders
in other states in an effort to avoid payment of the tax on local sales.
These purposes and consequences of the compensating use tax are
frankly recognized by the Court, but do not militate against the constitutionality of the tax.10 6
The possible discriminatory aspects of the compensating use tax,
complementary to the sales tax, apparently was first questioned on
commerce clause grounds in 1937, in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.10 7
There, the complaining taxpayer had purchased machinery and
materials outside the taxing state (Washington) for use in building
Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River. After the property had
come to rest, Washington sought to apply to it her tax levied on
the use of chattels in that state. The Silas Mason Company assailed
the tax as a violation of the commerce clause insofar as the tax
applied to chattels purchased in another state and used in Washington
thereafter. The Court, speaking through Justice Cardozo, upheld the
tax and refused the requested injunction against its enforcement.
The Court was of the opinion that the incidence of the use tax was
not upon the operation of interstate commerce, but upon the local
privilege of using the goods after commerce had ended. To support
its decision, the Court again relied upon the general property tax
as well as the general use tax. It reasoned that things acquired or
transported in interstate commerce may be subjected to a property
106. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937).
107. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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tax, nondiscriminatory in operation, when they have become part of

the common mass of property within the state of destination; and for
like reasons they have been subjected, when once they are at rest,
to a nondiscriminatory tax upon use or enjoyment. The privilege of
use was declared to be only one attribute, among many, of the bundle

of privileges that make up property ownership, and a state is at
liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all collectively, or to separate the
faggots and lay the charge distributively. Calling the Silas Mason, use
tax an excise when laid solely upon the use of the property did not,
thought the Court, make the power to impose it less, for anything
the commerce clause has to say of its validity, than calling it a property
tax and laying it on ownership.
The compensating use tax has considerable similarity to the general
use, storage and withdrawal taxes. However, one different feature
that claimed considerable attention by the Court in the Silas Mason
case was the possible discriminatory aspects of the compensating
use tax, since it was levied only on goods purchased out of state or
through interstate channels. But the Court found no grounds for
holding that the compensating use tax discriminated against interstate commerce. While the questioned Washington statute imposed
a tax upon the use of the chattels within the taxing state, it was
subject to an offset if another use or sales tax had been paid on it.
That was true whether the offsetting tax became payable to Washington by reason of purchase or use within the state, or whether the
offsetting tax had been paid to another state by reason of use or
purchase there. In short, no one who used property in Washington
after buying it at retail was to escape a tax upon the privilege of
enjoyment except to the extent that he had paid a use or sales tax
somewhere, but everyone who paid a use or sales tax in any other
state, to that extent, was exempt from the payment of the use tax
in the State of Washington. As Justice Cardozo put it: "Equality
is the theme that runs through all sections of the statute .... When
the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no
greater burden as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within
the gates."' 0 8
Although the sales and use taxes do not appear in the same statutory
enactment, that is not enough to condemn the use tax as discriminatory. It seems necessary, however, to find the tax on the local
purchases complementary to the use tax in order that the interstate buyer will not bear an economic burden disproportionate to
that borne by the local purchaser, with resulting discrimination against
interstate business. Where the sales and use taxes appear in the
same statute, there is no trouble in finding them complementary.
108. 300 U.S. at 583-84.
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In view of the fact that the sales exaction often appeared earlier than
the use tax, it became necessary to read the two statutes together
to avoid condemnation as discriminatory. Whether read together by
the highest state court, 10 9 or absent such construction by the state
forum, the Supreme Court of the United States has experienced no
difficulty in reading the statutes as complementary.
The question of discrimination is not necessarily confined to the
particular tax statute under attack, but may depend upon the resultant
of that and other tax statutes. Thus, if in the end product, the burden
borne by the interstate transaction is balanced by an equal burden
in another statute where the sale is strictly local, there is no discrimination. 110 "'There is no demand . . . in [the] Constitution,'" says
the Court, "'that the State shall put its requirements in any one
statute. It may distribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its
totality, is within the State's constitutional power.' """
Although the Silas Mason case was the first case involving the
validity of the compensating use tax, complementary to general
sales levies, the principle of compensating taxation in the interstate
commerce field had already received commerce clause blessing by
the Court. As early as 1868 the problem was presented to the Court
in Hinson v. Lott.112 This appears to have been among the Court's
earliest excursions into discriminating tax aspects of interstate commerce law. In the Hinson case, Alabama had laid a gallonage tax
on the sale of spiritous liquors, the products of sister states, but which
was not laid on local liquors. Comparing the gallonage tax on dealers
of out-of-state liquors with other taxes applicable to domestic products, the Court found that the tax levied on the out-of-state liquors
was not discriminatory since local distillers were subject to an equivalent amount of tax. While the methods of collection were different,
the taxes were complementary and were intended to effect equality
of the burden. The state was not playing favorites with home folks.
Another instance of constitutional compensating taxation can be
found in GeneralAmerican Tank Car Corp. v. Day."3 There Louisiana
laid, solely on nonresident corporations, a tax in lieu of local taxes
on rolling stock operated within the state. In comparing the tax on
the nonresident corporation with the local taxes upon residents, the
Court found no discrimination. In InterstateBusses Corp. v. Blodgett,n 4
a tax of one cent per mile of highway traversed by busses in interstate
commerce was upheld although there was no similar tax on intrastate motor carriers. Intrastate carriers were subject to a gross re109.
110.
111.
112.

Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U.S. 367 (1926).
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 584 (1937).
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1868).
113. 270 U.S. 367 (1926).
114. 276 U.S. 245 (1928).
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ceipts levy and an income tax, however, to which the interstate busses
were not subject. Upon comparison of the taxes imposed upon the
local carriers with the taxes imposed upon the interstate carriers,
the Court, speaking through Justice Stone, found that the complaining
taxpayers had not shown that the tax complained of fell with disproportionate economic weight on him. The mere fact that different
measures of taxation were applied to interstate and local carriers
was not tantamount to a discriminating preference to local business.
The case that perhaps most nearly answered the discrimination
argument in the Silas Mason compensating use tax case was Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query.115 There South Carolina taxed the use of
gasoline but exempted fuel upon which the local sales tax had been
paid. The United States Supreme Court construed the use tax as
being complementary to the sales tax and found the law did not
discriminate against interstate commerce. The taxpayer had "failed
to show that whatever distinction there existed in form, there was
1 6
any substantial discrimination in fact."'
The crux of this position on tax discrimination is succinctly and
picturesquely stated by Justice Cardozo in sustaining the Silas
Mason use tax:
"When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject
to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller
within the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the
other upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is
closed."11

7

In short, a party complaining of a tax does not establish discrimina-

tion against interstate commerce merely by showing that the tax to
which he is subjected is different in form," 8 or adopts a different
measure or method of assessment, or that he is subject to a larger
number of taxes than is a taxpayer doing wholly a local business.119
A tax is not discriminatory against interstate commerce if other related taxes impose equal burdens on local business. In order to show
that a taxpayer is discriminated against within the meaning of the
commerce clause condemnation it generally is necessary to show

that in actual practice the tax complained of falls with disproportionate economic weight on the complaining taxpayer12
115. 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
116. 286 U.S. at 482.
117. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 584 (1937).
118. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); Gregg Dyeing Co.
v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932); Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1868).
119. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Interstate Busses
Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928); cf. Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S.
1 (1918).
120. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 584-85 (1937); Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 480 (1932); Interstate Busses Corp. v.
Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 251 (1928).
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A statute may, of course, show on its face that it is aimed at
placing at a disadvantage out-of-state business when brought into
competition with competing local business.' 2 ' But the commerce
clause condemns discriminatory taxation whether forthright or ingenious. 22 Consequently, even though a tax is nondiscriminatory in
form, if in practical operation the tax gives local business a competitive advantage over interstate business, it will be condemned as
discriminatory. 123 Only by an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances can the issue of discrimination be determined by the Court.124
3. Summary Comment on Sales and Use Taxes
With the Helson'25 case as the fountain-head, there seems but
little opportunity for a state successfully to impose a use or other
enjoyment tax upon the operations of interstate commerce, where
the tax is upon the use of articles still considered within the stream
of that commerce, or upon the use of supplies or equipment actually
employed in conducting the commerce. But, subject to the limitation
that a state cannot levy a use tax on these actual operations of interstate commerce, the general use and other enjoyment taxes are now
excises so common that their validity has been virtually removed
from the area of debate, subject to a collection feature which will be
considered presently. Articles acquired or transported in interstate
commerce may be subjected, when once they are at rest, either at
the end of their interstate transportation or when they are at rest
during a break in the trip for the business purpose of the owner, to
a nondiscriminatory tax upon their use or enjoyment. The tax is
considered as a levy upon the privilege of local use of the goods after
121. A means of discrimination that made its appearance at a fairly early
date was that of exempting from the tax in question the local goods, thus
leaving only interstate business subject to the tax. I. M. Darnell & Son v.
Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886);
Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
Another form of discrimination that has been condemned is that of subjecting
nonresident business to higher tax rates than local business. Memphis Steam
Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
122. See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455 (1940).
123. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell,
311 U.S.454 (1940).
124. See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940); Dowlinig,
Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1, 16 (1940). justice
Stone introduced a new concept of tax discrimination in Gwin, White &Prince,
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939). In practical operation, he thought that
interstate commerce is discriminated against if it is subjected to the risk
of a cumulative tax burden not borne by local business, even though the taxing state in no sense purported to play favorites with its own businesses.
This is not the usual meaning of discrimination, however. For an extensive
treatment of discriminatory aspects of taxation, see Overton, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, 19 TENN. L. REv. 870 (1947).
125. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S: 245 (1929). For a discussion of the doctrine of this case, see the textual treatment supported by
notes 74-77 supra.
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the commerce has lost its interstate character and not a prohibited
tax upon the operations of interstate commerce.
In some respects the handling by the Court of sales, use and other
enjoyment taxes represents a keen awareness by the Court of the
revenue needs of the states. Activities and events indispensable to
interstate commerce have often been recognized by the Court as local
privileges for tax purposes, although the taxable moment may be
most brief, as illustrated by the use tax on supplies and equipment
shipped interstate for installation in interstate operations. The entire
movement, including the taxable installation, was "as nearly continuous as managerial efficiency can contrive."'' 1
The fact that use and other enjoyment taxes are directed at single
acts in the employment of articles, such as storage, withdrawal and
installation, seems to be the feature that often saves the tax from
condemnation as an exaction on the privilege of interstate commerce.
The legislator can here learn a valuable lesson in statutory draftsmanship. Instead of phrasing the tax so that it will meet its Waterloo
as a tax levied on the privilege of engaging in interstate business,
by astute draftsmanship acts or events closely related to interstate
commerce can be singled out as the incidence of the tax, and the
statute may produce as much revenue as if the legislature had been
permitted to invade that judically designated sanctuary of the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
But the distinction between permissible and nonpermissible use
and enjoyment taxes demonstrates clearly the mechanical nature of
the test employed by the Court to determine constitutionality, with
but little significance attached to the economic consequences of the
levy. Thus, the use tax cannot, consistent with the commerce clause,
be levied on the consumption of articles in interstate commerce,
because the Court feels that it is a tax on the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce. However, a sales tax imposed upon the single
local activity of selling the same articles would have been upheld,
even though the amount of the tax is passed on to the interstate
business. Similarly, use and storage taxes upon the single local
activity of storing or installing the articles immediately before they
begin to be consumed in interstate operation are valid, even though
,the state had a taxable grip for only a brief moment.
, It does seem to tax one's credulity a bit to understand how the
economic effect of those taxes held valid and those held invalid could
be appreciably different, especially where the burden of the tax
is shifted to the interstate business; all would seem to impinge
upon commerce equally from an economic standpoint. The increased
cost to the interstate operator from a sales tax or "a tax on installa126. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 173 (1939).
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tion is the same as from a tax on consumption or operation," says
the Court, but it adds that "this is not significant.' 12 7 "The prohibited
burden upon commerce between the states [in such instances],"
pontificates the Court, "is created by state interference with that
commerce, a matter distinct from the expense of doing business.' ' 28
Yet it is difficult for the writer to get away from the thought that the
real nub of a burden on commerce or the unreasonable hampering
or interference with commerce, which the commerce clause was designed to prevent, is the dollars and cents effect of the tax. The
thing that will place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage with a local business and thus erect a trade barrier, is a discriminatory cost handicap resulting from unequal tax treatment, and
not an inconsequential encroachment upon some conceptual judicial
notion of what is interstate commerce.
E. The Use Tax Collecting Device and the Constitutional Questions
Questions of discrimination and interstate trade barriers have not
been the only constitutional hurdles which the compensating use
tax has had to cross. A convenient administrative device employed
by the taxing states has been the requirement of the use tax statute
that the out-of-state seller serve as tax collector. The out-of-state
seller is required by the statute to collect the use tax and he is then
left to reimburse himself by increasing his price. So, although the
use tax itself may be cleared of constitutional objections, there remains the question whether the practice of requiring the out-of-state
seller to collect and pay the use tax constitutes an unconstitutional
interference with interstate commerce or a denial of due process. In
short, granting a valid taxable event, is there also constitutional
collectibility? The tax itself is a burden on one engaged in local
use, but coerced collection has a direct impact only on one engaged
in interstate transactions. Moreover, the taxing state pretty clearly
could not, consistent with due process or commerce clauses, tax the
129
out-of-state sale.
Until recently, this collection aspect of the use tax has not given
the Court much pause, but in arriving at its conclusion that the collection method imposes no constitutional difficulty, the Court often
confuses valid taxability with constitutional collectibility.
The constitutionality of the collection aspects of the use tax was
first raised in Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson.130 There, Iowa laid a
tax on the use of gasoline, but the out-of-state seller was doing
business in the taxing state. In sustaining the tax as against the
objection that the collection requirement ran afoul of constitutional
127. Id. at 177.
128. Id. at 177-78.
129. See McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).

130. 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
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requirements, the Court jumped from constitutional taxability to

constitutional collectibility. Speaking through Justice Roberts, with
respect to the point, the Court said:
"The statute obviously was not intended to reach transactions in interstate commerce, but to tax the use of motor fuel after it had come
to rest in Iowa, and the requirement that the appellant as the
shipper into Iowa shall, as agent of the State, report and pay the tax
on gasoline thus coming into the State for use by others on whom the
tax falls imposes no unconstitutional burden either upon interstate commerce or upon the appellant [out-of-state collector]."Sl1
With the Monamotor case as a precedent, until 1954, the Court
has made short work of the constitutional objection to collectibility
with either a quotation of the foregoing excerpt from the Monamotor
opinion, or a statement that making "the distributor the tax collector
132
for the State is a familiar and sanctioned device.'
Where the tax collector-seller has come into the state and does
business within its jurisdiction through agents with offices in the
state, 33 even though the transaction in question did not concern
the local business, 134 the seller-collector has pretty clearly submitted
to the power of the taxing state. But where the out-of-state seller has
never qualified to do business in the taxing state' and has no office,
branch, warehouse, or general agents in the taxing state, and its only
business is done through travelling salesmen, the nexus of the
taxing state with the collector-seller is rather slim. Nevertheless,
coerced collection of the tax by the out-of-state seller has been
sustained in this type of factual setup in General Trading Co. v. Tax
Commission.3 5 The Court disposed of the constitutional question of
collectibility with one observation: "To make the distributor the
tax collector for the State is a familiar and sanctioned device. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson .. .Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v.
Gallagher... ,136
It was a "familiar and sanctioned device" to make the out-of-state
seller serve as a collector when he had localized himself by operating
through a retail outlet within the taxing state, as was the Monamotor
and Felt & Tarrant situations; but it was neither familiar nor had
it been sanctioned when this was not the situation. In both Monamotor
and Felt & Tarrantthe out-of-state tax collectors were doing business
within the taxing jurisdiction and had submitted themselves to its
power. These cases are hardly due process precedents, however, for
the General Trading case, where the sales were made in the taxing
131. 292 U.S. at 95.
132. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944).
133. Felt &Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
134. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
135. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
136. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1944).
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state through solicitation of orders by travelling salesmen. As the
dissent pointed out through Justice Jackson, the Court held in the
General Trading case that a state has power to make a tax collector
out of one on whom it has no power to lay a tax.
In Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland,13 7 the Court felt that the
buyer's state had gone too far, consistent with due process, in making
the out-of-state seller serve as a use tax collector. There, the taxpayer, a Delaware seller, resisted a Maryland use tax statute which
required this nonresident seller to collect from Maryland residents
making retail purchases at seller-collector's. Delaware store. Some
of the taxed sales were cash-and-carry; others, amounting to some
$8,000 over a four-year period, involved delivery in Maryland by
private truck or common carrier. The seller was neither qualified to
do business in Maryland nor did it send its salesmen, solicitors or
agents into Maryland. No orders were taken by mail or telephone.
This extra-state seller advertised with only Delaware newspapers
and radio stations; but, although no ads were directed specially to
them, some did reach Maryland residents. Circulars were periodically
mailed to all former customers by seller, and these included Maryland
customers. Seller resisted Maryland's use tax collecting device, as
applied to him, on substantive due process of law grounds.
By a 5-4 vote the Court, in an opinion by Justice Jackson, who
wrote the dissent in General Trading, struck down Maryland's tax
collection statute as applied to this extra-state seller on the ground
that the facts do not disclose a connection between the taxing state
and this seller sufficient to satisfy the requirements of substantive due
process.
The Court distinguished General Trading on the ground that there
the out-of-state seller engaged in an "aggressive operation within
a taxing state"; and that the General Trading merchant's "rivalry with
the local merchants was equivalent to being a local merchant."
Whereas Miller Brothers engaged in only "the occasional delivery of
goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than the
incidental effects of general advertising." Miller Brothers was said
to have participated in "no invasion or exploitation of the consumer
market in Maryland." The sales by Miller Brothers were said to
have resulted from purchasers travelling from Maryland to Delaware
to exploit its less tax-burdened selling market. Actually, in General Trading, the only connection of the out-of-state seller with the
taxing state, as appears from the opinion, was the solicitation of
business by travelling salesmen. The writer has some difficulty in
understanding how General Trading solicitation is a different connection with the taxing state, for anything in the'due process clause,
137. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 9

from the deliveries and advertisement of Miller Brothers, all of which
activities in both cases were designed to create and hold a market
for the extra-state seller's goods.
Miller Brothers dissenting justices would sustain the Maryland tax
collecting device as applied to this out-of-state seller. The seller engaged in a regular course of conduct in which it regularly injected
advertising into media reaching Maryland consumers and regularly
effected deliveries within Maryland by its own delivery trucks and
by common carriers. In fact, service of process was accomplished on
seller by attaching his .truck on a trip into Maryland. The dissent
also points out that the seller would get paid for his trouble in serving
as tax collector. The Maryland statute provides that the sellercollector may retain three percent of the gross tax as compensation for
collection and remittance expenses.
In upsetting Maryland's tax collecting device, the Court uses
language which seems to indicate that since the taxing state cannot
levy a sales tax on the out-of-state seller, it cannot make this seller
serve as use tax collector. Justice Jackson's opinion emphasized
that Maryland could not have levied a sales tax in the situation at
.hand, and views as "strange law" a rule that would make the Delaware seller "more vulnerable to liability for another's tax than to a
tax on itself."'13 If the Court means to convey the idea that a seller
cannot constitutionally be compelled to collect a use tax where he
would not be subject to a sales tax, it is going squarely in the teeth of
all precedent. While an out-of-state seller is not subject to a sales
tax imposed by the state of the purchaser, 139 we have just seen that
there is an abundance of authority which has required the out-ofstate seller to collect a use tax due from a purchaser where there was
sufficient contact to satisfy the requirements of substantive due
process. We need mention only General Trading,140 Monamotor Oil
14 Co.,' 41 and Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co.,
all of which cases

we have just examined.
It is possible, of course, that the Court is laying the ground work for
nullifying the use tax collecting device, where a nonresident seller is
asked to collect, and thus make the reach of this use tax collecting device have only the same constitutional scope as the sales tax. That, of
course, would deal a body-blow to the revenue raising powers of the
states. If the Court did not intend to question the basic constitutionality of the nonresident seller collection device, it is indeed regrettable
that it has muddied the water in a yet not fully charted stream.
138. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954).

139. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
140. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
141. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
142. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939). To these
cases can also be added Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
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Although the legislative power of the states to impose upon the
out-of-state seller the duty of collecting the tax may be found to
satisfy substantive due process requirements, consistent with Miller
Brothers, in a particular situation, some very practical and troublesome problems yet remain in connection with the collection of the
use tax from the out-of-state seller. In short, granting legislative
jurisdiction in the states to impose upon the seller the duty of
collecting in the particular situation, do the states have judicial jurisdiction to enforce that duty? In General Trading the defendant-seller
voluntarily appeared in the tax collection suit and filed an answer.
The question of process, which was uncontested in General Trading,
may become crucial in other cases where the seller does not voluntarily appear in the tax collection suit. There due process may present another real obstacle, in addition to the Miller Brothers doctrine,
to the collection of the tax from the extra-state vendor.
Attachment as a means of process in a suit to collect the tax may be
out of the picture in most cases since the out-of-state seller usually
parts with title when he delivers the goods to the carrier. Or the
seller may keep his property out of the jurisdictional reach of the
buyer state, beyond the reach of attachment. Garnishment of some
debt due the seller or service of process on one of seller's travelling
salesmen appear to be the only remaining possibilities for service of
process. If the purchaser goes into the seller's state, there makes
the purchase and returns to the taxing state, or if the salesman has
left the state ahead of the process server, there may be no way by
which the taxing state can constitutionally reach the seller.
Even though the collecting state is fortunate enough to find a
debt that can be garnished or an article that can be attached, the
value of the article or the amount of the obligation may not equal
the amount of the tax. If the obligation garnished or the article attached do not satisfy the amount of the tax, the taxing state is constitutionally precluded from taking a judgment for the full amount of
the tax based on the garnishment or attachment (a personal judgment) that is entitled to full faith and credit in other states. Attachment or garnishment would thus appear to be pretty lame methods of
collecting use taxes under such circumstances.
If the Court can say that the out-of-state seller is doing business
within the taxing state so as to be regarded as present, service on
a soliciting agent could be the basis of a personal judgment for the
full amount of the tax. The fact that a foreign corporation is engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce does not prevent it from being
brought into court by service on an agent. 43 Once the taxing state
has reduced the tax claim to a valid judgment in its own forum, the
143. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[(VOL. 9

seller state must give full faith and credit to judgments for taxes. 144
However, there is some doubt whether the taxing state could maintain a suit against the out-of-state seller in the seller's state on the
original tax claim, without having first reduced the claim to judg45
ment.1
The nonresident motorist statutes concept, which pioneered in the
field of jurisdiction over nonresidents, might be extended to the outof-state seller who makes sales within the taxing state by agents
or mail-orders. 14 The pursuit of profits within the taxing state should
be as fair and adequate basis for jurisdiction as is the enjoyment of
travel on the highways of the state. Also there is a growing view
that "doing an act" within the state furnishes a sufficient nexus to
satisfy due process, as long as reasonable provision for notice is
made. 47
Where the buyer has gone out of the taxing state and made the
purchase beyond its borders, Miller Brothers teaches us that there
is no legislative jurisdiction to impose the duty of collecting the use
tax on the seller. Likewise, it is difficult to see how the taxing state
can there acquire any judicial jurisdiction to require the extra-state
seller to collect the tax. Under such circumstances there seems real
of
force in Lord Ellenborough's rhetorical question: "Can the island
48
Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?"'
IV.

TAXES ON GROSS RECEIPTS FROM INTERSTATE SALES TRANSACTIONS

A. Nature and Development

Much of the development of constitutional doctrine with respect to
taxation of interstate sales has taken place in the field of gross receipts taxes where proceeds from sales of tangible personal property
144. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
145. A state may properly refuse to entertain a suit by another state or
municipality to enforce a tax claim. Lending support to that proposition is
Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930). Accord, Wayne County v. American
Steel Export Co., 277 App. Div. 585, 101 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Ist Dep't 1950). But
in State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Conm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S.W.2d 919 (1946), Missouri did enforce a tax claim of Oklahoma. There is
now a federal statute which requires full faith and credit to be granted to
acts of legislatures, as well as to judgments of other states. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738 (1950).
146. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

147. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Commn, 339
U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S.310 (1945);
Note, Recent ConstitutionalDevelopments on Personal Jurisdiction of Courts,
4 V rD. L. REv. 661 (1951). Congress had removed the commerce clause obstacle in both Travelers and International Shoe. In InternationalShoe Chief
Justice Stone spoke of the estimate of the inconveniences to both parties and
concluded that due process would be met by such "contacts or ties with
the state of the forum to make it reasonable . . . to permit the state to

enforce the (particular suit which is brought there]." International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, supra at 320.
148. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East. 192, 194, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (K.B. 1808).

1956]

SALES TAXATION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

177

and sales of utility services made up all or part of the amount of the
proceeds affected by the tax.
A consideration of many of the cases included in the earlier section
dealing expressly with "sales taxes" might have been included under
the present section dealing with taxes on gross proceeds. Likewise,
many of the cases which are considered in the present category could
have been included in the earlier discussion of "sales taxes." Some
mention was made there, by way of comparison, of a few gross proceeds tax cases where the taxed gross proceeds included receipts
from sales. The division, actually made, of the cases between the
section dealing with sales taxes and the present section dealing with
gross proceeds taxes was determined by using a somewhat narrow
definition of gross proceeds taxes, adopted primarily for the convenience of discussion.
In its somewhat narrow meaning, and the one adopted here, taxes
on gross receipts or gross income include only those formally called
such and imposed on the recipient of gross receipts or income at an
annual or some other stated period. The tax may be imposed upon
all reported taxable gross proceeds of the taxpayer from whatever
source derived, including sales of various services. A basic exemption may also be allowed to each taxpayer. Gross receipts tax as here
used include both the "gross receipts tax" and the "gross income tax"
as classified and defined in the opening paragraphs of this article. 149
While the Court has looked with distinct disfavor upon taxes involving gross receipts from interstate commerce during most of
our constitutional history when challenged on commerce clause
grounds, nevertheless the first such attempt was sustained in the
case of State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts. 50 There Pennsylvania
had imposed a tax on the gross receipts of transportation companies,
the receipts being made up from freight charges received from transporting merchandise in interstate commerce. While adhering to
the premise that a state could not constitutionally regulate interstate commerce, the Court kept the tax out of that pitfall by deciding
that the fruits of interstate transportation ceased to be immune from
taxation after they became intermingled with the other property of
the carrier. As an alternative ground of decision, the Court considered the levy an excise tax upon the franchise of a corporation
created by the state, with gross receipts being a fair and convenient
measure of the exercise of that franchise.
Gross receipts taxes as a means of tapping this lucrative and easily
accessible source of revenue remained undisturbed for a period of
only about fifteen years, however. Then two cases were decided, in
149. See the classification of taxes as found in the material supported by
note 1 supra.
150. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 9

which the Court laid down principles that have influenced the judicial

thinking in this field virtually ever since. The cases were Fargo v.
Michigan'51 and Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania.152 The Fargo case upset a tax levied on gross receipts of a railroad received for carriage of freight and passengers across state lines.
It was declared void as a tax on interstate commerce. The Philadelphia
& Southern case struck down a like tax levied on the gross receipt
of a steamship company.
The Court took the position that income received from interstate
commerce was as necessary to the commerce as the transportation
itself; and when the state taxed the gross receipts from the transportation it was attempting by the tax to regulate the commerce itself,
in conflict with the exclusive power of Congress over interstate com53
merce.1
Although the ban against taxation of gross receipts from interstate
commerce had its origin in the transportation field, the compass of
the prohibition was so widened that it came to forbid levies on gross
receipts not only from transportation, but also communication receipts and proceeds from interstate sales of goods. Such levies were
outlawed as a direct burden on interstate commerce, which came to be
the doctrinal declaration used by the Court to condemn a tax as
15 4
violative of the commerce clause.
The doctrine of the decisions striking down taxes involving gross
receipts from interstate commerce has not been applied to taxes
involving taxes on "net" income derived from interstate commerce.
Here it is said the tax is levied after the commerce has taken place,
expenses have been paid, losses adjusted and the individual is free
to use the money as he sees fit. Thus, taxes on "net" income have
withstood an assault on commerce clause grounds, although the
profits are derived principally from interstate sales transactions. 155
151. 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
152. 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
153. Philadelphia and So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
154. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama State Bd. of Assessment, 132 U.S.
472 (1889); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 128 U.S. 39 (1888); Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888). In the much later
case of J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) the Court used
this -theory as an alternative ground for upsetting a tax levied on gross receipts from sales.
155. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942); Wisconsin
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 311 U.S. 452 (1940); Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S.
321 (1918); cf. West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 116 P.2d

861, aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946). A footnote in the Spector Motor
opinion seems to cast some doubt as to whether the Court will continue,
in the future, to uphold taxes levied on "net" income derived from interstate commerce. In the Memphis Natural Gas case, Chief Justice Stone had
said, at page 656, that "even if taxpayer's business were wholly interstate
commerce, a nondiscriminatory tax by Tennessee upon the net income. ...
derived from within the state ....is not prohibited by the commerce clause."
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Even a tax measured by "net" income from sales will be upset, however, where the subject of the tax is the privilege of engaging in a
156
business that is exclusively interstate.
1. Early Methods of Imposing a Limited Tax on Gross Receipts
It did not follow that all taxes involving gross receipts would
transcend commerce clause limitations. Two methods of shrinking
the zone of tax immunity of gross receipts evolved.
One method was the so-called "in lieu of" tax, which meant that
the gross receipts tax was levied as a fair substitute for all other taxes
which the taxing state could constitutionally impose on taxpayer's
property. An early instance where the Court held it competent for a
state to levy this type of a tax was United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 5 7 where Minnesota had taxed the gross receipts of express
companies, although they were engaged in interstate business within
her borders. Professing to adhere to the doctrine that a state could not
burden or regulate interstate commerce by taxing the conduct of
that commerce, the Court held that since the tax on gross receipts was
imposed "in lieu of" all taxes upon the property of the express companies, it was a competent exercise of the state's taxing power. The
tax was treated as a fair substitute for a property tax on the business
of a going concern.
The resort to gross receipts taxes as a fair substitute for all other
taxes which the taxing state could constitutionally impose on the
taxpayer's property has become a familiar and sanctioned type of*
tax. 5

8

A second method of reaching gross receipts by a tax was to levy
the tax on some "local activity" which could be separated from the
interstate branch of a multistate business, and to measure the amount
of the tax by gross receipts from the activity. One of the early cases
in this field successfully to withstand a commerce clause attack was
Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 159 decided in 1891, just four years after
the states had been rebuffed in their gross receipts tax attempts in
the Philadelphia& Southern case. The Court had before it a statute
of Maine imposing upon a foreign corporation engaged in interstate
The writer of the Spector Motor opinion observes, at page 609, footnote 6, that
the language quoted from the Memphis Natural Gas opinion is not essential
to the decision of that case. One writer apparently is completely satisfied that
the Spector footnote gave the quietus to the view that net income derived
wholly from interstate commerce can be taxed. See Marsh, Interstate Commerce: State Taxation of Motor Carriers,41 A.B.A.J. 603 (1955).
156. E.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
157. 223 U.S. 335 (1912).

158. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Northwestern

Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918); United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223
U.S. 335 (1912).
159. 142 U.S. 217 (1891).
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railroad business a tax "for the privilege of exercising its franchise
within the State of Maine." The tax was measured by the gross
receipts from interstate and local commerce which were derived
from business within the taxing state. The tax was not imposed upon
interstate commerce, but upon the local privilege of exercising the
corporate franchise within the state, gross receipts constituting
only the measure of the tax. Since only those gross receipts which
were derived from business within the taxing state were included
in the reach of the tax, it was thought to be a fair means of ascertaining the value of the local privilege of carrying on business within the
state by a foreign corporation. The Court took pains to point out,
however, that the Maine tax was not levied on the receipts themselves,
either in form or in fact. Similarly, gross receipts may be used to
fix the figure of the tax where the taxable event is the privilege
of existing as a domestic corporation. 160 Since the right to exist as
a state corporation and carry on business in a corporate capacity as a
domestic corporation depends solely upon the grace of the state, the
incorporating state may measure a charge for that privilege by the
gross receipts of business transacted within the state.
Using gross receipts to determine the value of a local activity or
event for tax purposes has been applied to a wide variety of business
activities including manufacturing, production and extraction of natural resources. That manufacturing, production and extraction are not
in themselves interstate commerce, for tax purposes, even when
followed by interstate transportation, has always been sound consti161
tutional gospel.
This is true even though the power of Congress over interstate commerce gives Congress power to deal with many aspects of these basic
local pursuits. 162 Consequently, the state of origin could impose a
160. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U.S. 549 (1915); Ashley v.
Ryan, 153 U.S. 436 (1894) (tax on privilege of consolidation of corporations).
161. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (generation of
electricity); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (extraction of
gas); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (mining); American
Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919) (manufacture of goods for sale).
162. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769
(1945), Chief Justice Stone declared that "Congress has undoubted power
to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce," and added
that "it may either permit the States to regulate the commerce in a manner
which would otherwise not be permissible" or "exclude state regulation even
of matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate
commerce." The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is so
complete and paramount in character that Congress may supersede state
action even in fields which are admittedly local, where Congress uses that
power as the basis for the affirmative establishment of national policy over
interstate commerce, and conflicting state action becomes inoperative. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); New York v. United States,
257 U.S. 591 (1922); Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257
U.S. 563 (1922); Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(Shreveport Rate Cases); cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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tax on the privilege of manufacturing, 163 production of commodities'6 4
or extraction of resources 165 sold in interstate commerce and measure
the tax by the gross receipts from such sales. The tax is considered
as levied on a local activity distinct from interstate commerce. The
use of the gross receipts, including gross receipts from interstate sales,as a measure, is simply a convenient, sanctioned means of arriving at
the value of the local privilege of manufacturing, production and
extraction. Here the gross receipts tax has been upheld even when
166
levied "in addition to an ad valorem property tax.'
Considerable litigation has resulted over taxation of receipts from
the sale of oil and gas. In determining the taxability of the receipts
after propulsion of the oil or gas has started a journey across state
lines, there arises the question whether there can be such a "local
activity" or does the entire operation constitute interstate commerce so
as to preclude the imposition of a tax. The Court has had no hesitancy
in permitting the states to use the gross proceeds from the interstate
sale of the oil and gas in determining the value of the local taxed
activity of extraction and production. 167 Also, there may be a taxable
event at the conclusion of the interstate transportation of the oil
and gas. The Court has gone rather far at times in finding localism
on the consuming end, and receipts from sales of gas brought in from
a sister state can be taxed if the sale is necessarily the last, because
consummated by consumption of the commodity. 168 Ostensibly the
Court has given considerable weight to the reduction of the pressure of
the gas and of the increase of its volume to make it safe and suitable
for entry into the pipes and burners of the consumers. The Court has
observed that the "treatment and division of the large compressed
volume of gas is like the breaking of an original package, after shipment in interstate commerce, in order that its contents may be
treated, prepared for sale and sold at retail."'169 The tensile strength
of the Court's analogy of reducing pressure to the "breaking of the
original package" to create a taxable event is not very great nor
reliable, because the reduction of pressure to make delivery to a
connecting carrier in an interstate journey of oil and gas has not
created a taxable event. There the Court has expressly forbidden
163. American Vffg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
164. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (electricity).
165. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (gas); cf. Oliver
Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (mining).

166. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).

167. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (state taxed proceeds
from interstate sale of gas in estimating value of the product at the well).
168. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931); cf. Southern

Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937). In this connection, it
should also be remembered the extent to which the Court went in finding
a taxable local event for a sales tax in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), and its three companion cases. For a discussion of these cases see textual material supported by notes 50-60 supra.
169. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465, 471 (1931).
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taxation where the pressure is reduced for the purpose of making delivery by the taxpayer to a distributing company which, in turn, will
sell the commodity. 70 The policy of the Court in permitting a tax where
the sale is to the consumer, and striking down the tax where the
sale and transfer is to another pipeline carrier solely for further
transportation, may be fair and equitable; although some of the
reasoning by which the decisions were reached cannot be supported.
'Even though an intrastate business and an interstate business are
inseparable, a local privilege tax measured by gross receipts will
be good if not laid inseparably upon both.17 ' The intrastate aspects
of the business can serve as a proper subject of a tax with the gross
receipts as a fair measure, and a taxpayer cannot avoid a tax upon
the taxable aspects of a business by engaging in nontaxable phases
of the business.
In dealing with taxes on gross receipts prior to 1938, the Court was
concerned with two main considerations. On the one hand, it seemed
generally concerned with the essential fairness that the states should
be allowed to tax property and local events within their boundaries,
to tax them at actual value as a going concern, which took into account the augmentation of value attributable to the interstate business in which it might be employed. 1 2 On the other hand, the Court
generally tried to adhere to the judicially declared doctrine that the
states could not constitutionally tax interstate commerce. These two
considerations hardly admit of an absolutely logical or philosophical
reconciliation. The Court was, therefore, confronted with the task of
striking what appeared to the Court a practical, workable balance.
When the state legislature used the gross receipts simply as a
measure to value local activities and property, there was less likelihood, thought the Court, that the taxing state would attempt to,
or would, affect injurious interferences with commerce than when it
aimed its tax directly at the receipts from interstate commerce.11 3
170. State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931).

To the same effect in granting tax immunity to oil and gas where the pipe
line transportation is purely interstate, see Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier,
266 U.S. 555 (1925); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921);

Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921); cf. Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346 (1917) (tax invalidated on privilege of
distributing oil transported interstate by tank cars to fill orders). But cf.
Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949). Nor did increasing
gas pressure create a taxable local activity in Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line
Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
171. Fincklen v. Shelby County, 145 U.S. 1 (1892) (sustained a tax upon
brokers measured by gross commissions earned in negotiating interstate sales).
For a careful analysis of this, somewhat controversial case, see Lockhart,
Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HARV. L. REV. 617, 629-31 (1939). For
additional authority supporting this general proposition, see Pacific Tel. Co. v.
Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936) (occupation tax measured by gross receipts struck down where the tax was laid inseparably on both); see Southern
Ry. v. Watts and Watts, 260 U.S. 51,9, 530 (1923).
172. E.g., Pullian Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923).

173. See United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335, 345 (1912);
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There is language in some of the opinions indicating that the Court
considered the tax invalid because gross receipts were used as a
measure or method of valuing a local activity or event. The Court,
at times, seemed to feel that interstate commerce was unconstitutionally burdened by the measure of the tax rather than the subject.174
Ordinarily, however, if the tax is laid upon a subject within the taxing power of the state, it has not been condemned because of the
measure as such. The "validity of the tax can in no way be dependent
upon the mode which the state may deem fit to adopt in fixing the
amount.' '175 Thus spoke the Court. And as if to emphasize the point,
the Court went on to declare that no "constitutional objection lies
in the way of a legislative body prescribing any mode or measurement
to determine the amount it will charge for the privilege it bestows."
On occasions, however, the language used by the Court goes rather
far in supporting the view that the legislatively designated measure
is an infringement of the commerce clause. 17 6 An examination of
the language employed by the Court in upsetting a tax because of
an unsuitable measure indicates that the Court perhaps treated the
alleged measure of the tax as really the subject or operating incidence
of the tax.
2. Summary Comment on Pre-1938 Approach
Prior to 1938, a state could impose a tax on gross receipts from interstate commerce only if the tax (1) was levied in lieu of a property
tax; or (2) was used as a fair measure of the value of a local event
or activity. Unless the Court was satisfied that the gross receipts tax
satisfied these requirements, prior to 1938 it had a firm-policy against
permitting taxes on gross receipts derived from interstate transactions.
Short shrift was made of such taxes by labelling them "regulation
of the commerce, a restriction upon it,' 1 7 or a "direct burden" upon
17 8
the commerce.
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 227 (1908). Even though the
tax was expressly designated a gross receipts tax, if it amounted to no more
than an ordinary tax upon property or a just equivalent therefor, it was not
open to attack. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918). If the gross receipts tax was levied in
addition to ad valorem property taxes, rather than "in lieu of" such taxes, it
was proscribed by the commerce clause. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd.
of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930); Meyer v. Wells, Fargo &Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912).
174. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930). This
has been particularly true in some of the capital stock franchise tax cases.
E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
175. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 600 (1890); see also Baltic
Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 87 (1913).
176. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930).
For a later case where the Court seems to treat the designated measure of
gross receipts as, in effect, the subject of the tax, see Gwin, White & Prince
v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
177. See Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 227 (1908); Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 336 (1887).

178. See Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 297 (1917).
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Especially before 1938, and for a good bit of the time since that date,
from the standpoint of the economic effect of the tax, the Court drew
a distinction in gross receipts taxes that is artificial and mechanical.
Thus, while the Court forbade the states to levy a privilege tax "on"
unapportioned gross receipts from multistate transactions, the states
ordinarily, could nevertheless constitutionally impose a tax on certain "local activities" and measure the value of the taxed activity by
the gross receipts. 7 9 A tax upon a local privilege measured by the
volume of gross receipts from both local and interstate trade would
seem to have, in practical results, the same consequences for hampering or suppressing the commerce as one laid "directly" upon the receipts. American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis' 80 serves as a ready

instance of this distinction drawn by the Court. There the tax was
letied on the privilege of manufacturing and measured by the gross
income of the manufacturing plant, which included out-of-state sales.
St. Louis, of course, used the correct statutory ritual-it phrased the
statute so that it was a tax "on" the privilege of manufacturing,
measured by gross receipts. 181 In the subsequent Adams' 82 case Justice
Roberts significantly points out that the tax in the American Manufacturing case "was upon the privilege of manufacturing within the
state and it was permissible to measure the tax by the sales price
of the goods produced rather than by their value at the date of manufacture. If the tax there under consideration had been a sales tax
the city could not have measured it by sales consummated in another
3
state." 8
It should follow, therefore, that the imponderables of the commerce
clause and gross receipts taxes would disappear with changes in the
wording of the questionable or condemned tax statutes from a tax
"9upon gross income" to a tax upon some other subject such as "upon the
privilege" of manufacturing, production, residence or some other
local activity or event, even though calculated at the same rate on the
same gross income from the same transaction as before. Such has
not been the case, however. Constitutionality has not always been
achieved by simply casting the tax in terms of having as its subject
some selected "local incident," and the Court has failed to develop
179. "Names were made to matter more than mathematics or economics."
Powell, More Ado about Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 IAav. L. REv, 501, 503
(1947).
180. 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
181. In a per curiam opinion in 1941 the Court sustained a Mississippi privilege tax measured by gross income, where applied to the receipts of a taxpayer who manufactured goods in Mississippi, accepted the orders solicited
by his out-of-state salesmen and shipped the goods out of Mississippi. Aponaug
Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comnm'n, 190 Miss. 805, 1 So. 2d 763 (1941), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Aponaug Mfg. Co. v. Stone, 314 U.S. 577 (1941).
182. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
183. Id. at 312, 313. Cf. Powell dontemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State Taxation, 76 U. PA. L. Rzv. 773, 774 (1928) ("states
can tax interstate commerce if they go about it in the right way.").
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a workable standard to guide the legislatures in deciding .when a
tax was "on"' a "local activity" rather than "on" an interstate activity.18

4

B. Justice Stone and a Pragmatic Approach to Gross Receipts
Taxes: InterstateCommerce Pays Its Way
1. Cumulative Burdens Test of Tax Validity
In 1938 a different approach to the constitutionality of gross receipts
taxes made its appearance. Justice Stone worked out an approach to
the question of the validity of state gross receipts taxes which would
not only be more reliable but which would also give more consideration to the possible economic effects of the particular tax on interstate commerce and less consideration to the formal aspects of the
tax. Explicit, too, in his approach is the essential fairness that interstate commerce should bear its fair share of the cost of local government whose protection it enjoys.
Justice Stone's views reached fruition in the case of Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue. 18 New Mexico had levied an occupation
tax on the privilege of engaging in certain businesses, one of which
was the publication of newspapers and magazines. The tax imposed
was two per cent of the gross receipts from the sale of advertising.
The Court sustained the tax as applied to the proceeds of the sale.
One ground of the holding was the application of the traditional
test of calling it a tax on the "local activity" of preparing, printing
and publishing magazine advertising and the gross receipts from the
business fairly measured the value of the local enterprise. The fact
that the advertising rate was computed, in part, on the basis of
the interstate circulation of the magazine imposed no burden upon
interstate commerce which the commerce clause interdicts; the burden
was said to be too remote; the effect of the tax was innocuously incidental.
184. A comparison of a few cases will furnish ready examples of the unreliableness of the standard developed by the Court. Loading and unloading
interstate commerce has been held an integral, non-taxable part of interstate
commerce. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937)
and Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947). But
the transfer of possession of articles transported interstate by land has been
held a local, taxable event. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,
309 U.S. 33 (1940). An occupation tax on radio broadcasting, measured by
gross receipts from sales of time to customers has been invalidated as a
tax on interstate commerce. Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n,
297 U.S. 650 (1936). It might well be inquired whether the broadcasting activities really were any more interstate commerce than the generation of
electricity where the generation and transmission are simultaneous as in Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932), where the Court found a
"local activity" to serve as the subject of the tax.
185. 303 U.S. 250 (1938). For a discussion of this case and others applying
the same approach to the question of tax validity, against the background of
much of the earlier case law on sales taxes in interstate commerce, see
Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HARV. L. Ray. 617 (1939).
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As an "added reason" for sustaining the tax, Justice Stone introduced the "cumulative burden" test for determining the validity of
gross receipts taxes. Justice Stone's explanation of this new criterion
seemed to be that while interstate commerce, as such, could be taxed,
the validity of a tax would be determined by whether, in form or substance, the tax could be repeated by another state on the same
segment of interstate commerce, so as to make that commerce bear a
cumulative tax burden not borne by local business. The theory behind this test was the practical double demand that (1) interstate
commerce should "pay its way," by not escaping the burdens of local
government whose benefits it enjoys; and (2) state taxes on interstate commerce should be sustained when not involving risk of
"cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce." The Court
could see no risk of other states imposing a forbidden cumulative tax
burden on the same transactions as that taxed in the Western Live
Stock case. So the tax was sustained.
In the Western Live Stock opinion Justice Stone marshalled cases
of gross receipts taxes on interstate transportation, originally sustained on very different grounds, to support the "cumulative burdens"
doctrine. The potential risk of a multiple or cumulative tax burden
on interstate commerce as compared with local business was made,
by Justice Stone's analysis, the controlling factor in separating those
gross receipts taxes on transportation which had been struck down
from those which had been upheld. He explained that such taxes
had "been sustained when fairly apportioned to the commerce carried
on within the taxing State."' 86
In grouping the gross receipts tax cases used to support the "cumulative burdens" doctrine, into those sustained where apportioned, Justice
Stone makes a neat, but not a doctrinally accurate, classification of
the cases. The Court that decided those gross receipts cases at no
place in the opinions mentioned any sort of doctrine such as apportionment to avoid a cumulative tax burden. An examination of
the cases reveals that in those instances where the Court upheld
a tax it did so on one of two theories. The tax was sustained either
on the traditional theory that the "subject" of the tax was some "local"
event (privilege or franchise), separate and distinct from the commerce, with its value determined by gross receipts, 187 or that the
gross receipts tax was levied "in lieu" of, and as a fair substitute for,
all other valid taxes on taxpayer's property. 188 The cases cited by
Justice Stone, where the gross receipts tax had been outlawed, had
186. Id. at 256.

187. Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903); Maine v.

Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217 (1891).

188. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918); United States
Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912).
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been considered by the Court making the decision, to transcend constitutional limitations upon the traditional doctrine that the tax was
tantamount to a regulation of interstate commerce by the states,
a power thought vested exclusively in Congress. 189 No mention was
made by the Court of a lack of apportionment.
In truth, Justice Stone's Western Live Stock opinion misinterpreted
the facts of the Fargo'90 case, when he stated that the gross receipts
tax was invalidated because it extended to "commerce carried on
without the state boundaries and, if valid, could be similarly laid in
every other state in which the business was conducted." The Fargo
tax was confined to earnings received from the use of the taxed
cars within the state. It is difficult to see how an apportionment could
have been fairer or how it more clearly could have avoided the risk
of "cumulative burdens," which Justice Stone reasoned in his Western
Live Stock opinion was the "vice characteristic of those taxes [taxes
from transportation measured by gross receipts] which have been
held invalid." Presumably "unapportionment" was a tax "vice"
of which the Court was not cognizant when it decided the Fargo case.
A few weeks after Western Live Stock the "cumulative burdens"
test again was invoked in a case which was concerned with gross
receipts taxes imposed by the state from which the seller shipped to
the extra-state buyer. This time the shoe was put on the other foot
in so far as the "cumulative burden" test was concerned. In Adams
9
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,1
' an Indiana gross income tax ran
afoul of the commerce clause when imposed directly on the receipts
of a local manufacturer derived from interstate sales requiring outof-state delivery. Although not spelled out so clearly, the "cumulative
burden" test was used as an alternative theory for striking down the
tax, the Court speaking also of the tax as a burden on the commerce.
In the Adams case there was no attempt to apportion the receipts
so as to represent only those activities which took place within the
state. As later pointed out in the Berwind-White' 92 case, at least part
of the receipts covered by the Adams tax included values attributable
to extra-state activities. Since the tax was not apportioned to those
values attributable to the taxing state, it was thought to threaten a
double tax burden not borne by local commerce, on the theory that
if the tax by the manufacturing state were sustained, a similar tax
could be imposed by the buyer's state. Interstate commerce would
thus be subject to the risk of a double tax burden, not borne by local
189. Meyer v. Wells Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912); Galveston, H. & S.A.
Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908); Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
190. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
191. 304 U.S. 307 (1938). For a helpful discussion of the "cumulative
burden" doctrine, see Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 4 TAx L. REV. 95 (1948).
192. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 57
(1940).
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commerce. In condemning the tax, a divided Court spoke through
Justice Roberts, in part declaring that "the vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that the tax includes in its
measure, without apportionment, receipts derived from activities in
interstate's commerce; and that the exaction is of such a character that
if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by states in
which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are manufactured."
It really is not clear from Justice Roberts' Adams opinion exactly
what he means by the phrase "without apportionment." It is not
clear whether he meant only "without apportionment between local
and interstate receipts," or whether he meant "without splitting the
1 93
interstate receipts between the participating States.'
The Court differentiated the Adams tax from that in the American
Manufacturing'94 case on the grounds that the American Manufacturing tax was not a sales tax but an excise on manufacturing, measured
by the proceeds of the sales of the manufactured goods. The Court then
goes on to observe that had the American Manufacturing exaction been
a sales tax the taxing authority could not have used interstate sales to
measure the amount of the tax.195 It seems fairly clear, however, that
both types of tax would have yielded the same amount of revenue in
the American Manufacturing situation.
In the Adams case, Mr. Justice Black delivered the first of a series
of dissenting opinions 96 to the effect that, absent discrimination
against interstate commerce, no state tax should be struck down as
violative of the commerce clause. He would leave the matter to
Congress and until such time as Congress did act to forbid a particular type of state tax, he thinks the Court should let it stand. Mr.
Justice Black's theory is that bnly Congress has constitutional authority or practical capacity to formulate rules for curtailing state taxes.
Shortly after the Adams case, the Court, in the Gwin, White19
case condemned a Washington occupation tax, measured by gross
receipts from sales made by taxpayers who were commission
merchants of a Washington sales agency engaged in obtaining orders
for and supervising shipment and sale of Washington fruit throughout
193. Compare Justice Roberts' statement in J. D. Adams Mg. Co. v. Storen,
304 U.S. 307 (1938), at page 311 with his statement at page 314 of the same
case. See Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 501,
521-22 (1947).
194. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
195. J. D. Adams Mig. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1938).
196. Id. at 316. See, e.g., dissenting opinions in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 455 (1939), and in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188 (1940). Mr. Justice Black apparently has had
a change of heart as to what is the proper judicial function for the Court,
for he has joined in striking down a state tax although there was no discrimination. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
197. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
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the United States. For the privilege of engaging in business activities,
Washington levied a tax measured by the proceeds from sales of
fruit grown in and shipped from Washington. The Court felt that the
taxed proceeds included not only that part of the proceeds' of sales
attributable to the taxpayer within the taxing state, but also included
receipts attributable to extra-state activities by sales agencies. These
sales agency employees or agents outside the state would sell fruit
shipped to points beyond the state before there were orders for it.
The reach of the tax, however, included income only from the sale
of those apples that grew in the taxing state. The Court reasoned
that if the Gwin, White tax were valid, a similar tax could be imposed on the same sales proceeds by those states in which the sales
agents operated, thus resulting in a heavier tax burden on interstate
sales than local sales. The tax would thus place interstate commerce
at a competitive disadvantage with local commerce. Since the Gwin,
White tax was not apportioned, the Court felt that it tried to reach
receipts derived from activities beyond the territorial limits of the
taxing state.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Stone felt that in practical operation the Gwin, White tax discriminated against the interstate commerce, through the risk of a cumulative tax burden not borne by local
business. This interpretation of discrimination is not the usual meaning applied to that term, however. A tax is generally said to be discriminatory only when the taxing state is giving its own business
better treatment taxwise than interstate business. 198 That was not
true of the Gwin, White case tax. The theme of the tax was equality.
One wonders whether Justice Stone put this particular thought into
his opinion in an effort to woo and win Mr. Justice Black, who would
strike down no state tax unless actual discrimination against interstate
commerce were proved; the risk of discrimination is not enough for
Mr. Justice Black. While he may have been wooed; he was not won.
He dissented.
It should be noted in passing that the condemned Washington tax
had as its "subject" the taxpayer's occupation, which is clearly a
local event, and gross receipts were used as the "measure" of the tax.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the observance of this traditional
statutory "subject-measure" ritual did not absolve the tax of commerce clause infirmities. Justice Stone observes "that the tax, though
nominally imposed upon appellant's activities in Washington, by
the very method of its measurement reaches the entire interstate
commerce service rendered both within and without the state and
burdens the commerce in direct proportion to its volume." This,
language suggests that the Court is using the legislatively designated
198. See textual material supported by notes 118-24 supra.
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measure as a factor in deciding what really is the subject or operative
incidence of the tax.199 Viewing the matter realistically, if the state
is given completely free rein in selecting a measure of the tax,
its tax could be as oppressive to interstate commerce as if it were
permitted unlimited use of the commerce itself as the subject.
Both the Adams and Gwin, White taxes on gross proceeds from
sales had been on the seller's end of the interstate operation. Shortly
thereafter, under the caption of a local "taxable event" the Court
sanctioned a sales tax imposed on the "transfer of possession" of goods
at the situs of the goods when the sales transaction was consummated
by delivery to the purchaser at the conclusion of an interstate journey.
That was the teaching of the sales tax case of McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite,200 and its three companion cases. 20 1 During the next few years
after the historic Berwind-White decision, the Court handed down
a series of cases involving taxes laid "directly on" gross receipts received over a stated period rather than a tax on a single sale or
event, as was the situation in the Berwind-White matter. In one
case the tax was applied to gross income, including receipts from
interstate transactions other than sales, but in several cases the tax
was laid on gross receipts which included proceeds from interstate
transactions.
Within a few years after the Berwind-White decision, the Court
not only had an opportunity to visit gross income tax situations factually akin to the Berwind-White state of purchaser tax, but it also had
a look at gross income taxes by the seller state. In Department of
Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp.2 02 in 1941, the Court was confronted with the question whether it would permit the state of the
seller to include in a tax laid directly on gross income the receipts from
sales where the sale was followed by interstate transportation.
Indiana's gross receipts tax was again called into judgment in that
case. There the seller taxpayer, a Delaware corporation, made contracts
outside Indiana for the sale of railroad ties. Ties were obtained from
producers in Indiana and delivered to the buyer (Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad) in Indiana, where they were immediately loaded on cars
and shipped out of the state to seller's plant in Ohio for creosoting.
Payments for the ties were made to the taxpayer-seller in Pennsylvania, where it had its principal place of business. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, unanimously held that Indiana
199. For a discussion of the "subject-measure" ritual as a criterion of tax
validity, see textual material supported by notes 173-75 supra.
200. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
201. McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430
(1940); McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940); Jagels, "A
Fuel Corporation" v. Taylor, 255 App. Div. 965, 8 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1st Dep't
1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 766, 21 N.E.2d 526 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 309 U.S. 619
(1940).
202. 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
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did not exceed its constitutional authority when it imposed a tax
directly on the gross receipts from those sales. The sale and delivery
of the ties to the railroad company were held to be local transactions,
despite the fact that immediately after the sale the ties were shipped
out of the state by the buyer pursuant to the contract.
Moreover, no apportionment was necessary, since the sole subject
of the challenged tax was the income derived from the sale. The
creosoting operations in Ohio and the income derived therefrom, were
not included in the questioned tax. This feature points up the vice
of having included in the reach of the tax any receipts from extrastate activities that would give rise to the risk of multiple tax as was
said to be the situation in the Adams and Gwin, White cases, where
the seller state imposed the nullified tax. The entire taxed Wood
Preserving receipts were thus attributable to the taxing state because
substantial activity occurred there and nowhere else. The Wood Preserving case is thus consistent with the Adams and Gwin, White
doctrine, especially as explained by Justice Stone in the BerwindWhite case.
In 1944 the Court had a comprehensive look at the validity of a
tax laid directly on gross income from sales at both ends of the
interstate journey in International Harvester Co. v. Department of
Treasury.20 3 There the question before the Court was the validity
of the inclusion in a tax levied on gross income of the receipts from
sales followed by interstate transportation, as well as the inclusion
of receipts from sales where the sale followed after the interstate
journey. The seller-taxpayer, a foreign corporation authorized to do
business in Indiana (the taxing state), maintained manufacturing and
sales branches in the taxing state and in other states.
In this case the taxpayer contested three different types of transactions to which Indiana applied her gross receipts tax. In class C
type sales Indiana buyers bought from branches of the seller-taxpayer
outside Indiana. The contracts of sale were entered into outside
Indiana, but the buyers took delivery to themselves at factories of
203. 322 U.S. 340 (1944).

Indiana's Department of Treasury had made two

additional, successful trips to the Supreme Court of the United States. In

Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313

U.S. 252 (1941), the Court sustained her tax on gross income as applied to
receipts of a company enameling stove parts brought into Indiana for that
purpose and shipped out again immediately following the enameling operation. The business had been solicited by agents operating in other states.
The Court felt that the whole taxed operation was attributable to the taxing state. The Court thus found a taxable local event even though interstate commerce was necessary for the performance of the enameling operation. Also, in Department of Treasury v. Allied Mills, Inc., 220 Ind. 340, 42
N.E.2d 34 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 740 (1943), Indiana successfully
applied her tax on gross income to receipts from sales to resident customers in
Indiana to whom deliveries of goods were made from plants of taxpayer in
Illinois pursuant to orders taken in Indiana and accepted in Illinois. Taxpayer
had factories in Indiana and also Illinois.
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the seller-taxpayer in Indiana. In class D type sales buyers outside
Indiana bought from branches in Indiana, and the contracts were
entered into in Indiana. The buyers took delivery at factories of the
seller-taxpayer in Indiana. In Class E type sales, Indiana buyers
made purchases from Indiana branches where the contracts were made,
but the goods were shipped by the seller-taxpayer from its factories
outside the state to the buyers in Indiana.
The Court held that Indiana's tax on gross receipts could be applied to all three classes of sales without infringing either the commerce clause or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In all three classes of sales the Court found local transactions, separate
from the interstate phases, which could properly serve as taxable
events. It was thought not unreasonable to attribute the entire proceeds of the transactions to the taxing state, because substantial activities occurred there and the tax did not purport to reach proceeds from
extra-state activities which had no connection with the taxing state,
as was the situation in the Adams and Gwin, White cases. The state
could thus tax the full proceeds of the sales even though the proceeds
might be taxable again elsewhere. This rationale is consistent with the
theory upon which the Berwind-White decision is predicated.
In class C sales, the delivery of the goods in Indiana at the end of
the interstate journey was declared an adequate taxable event. The
Court reasoned that Indiana could have imposed a sales or a use tax
on these class C transactions. And if this is true, concluded the Court,
"there is no constitutional objection to the imposition of a gross receipts tax by the State of the buyer. 2 04 When the taxing state (Indiana) lays hold of the transaction and imposes a tax on the receipts
which accrue from it, she is asserting authority over the fruits of a
transaction consummated within her borders. So reasoned the Court.
In class D sales, the delivery of the goods at the beginning of the
interstate journey and the making of the contracts within the taxing
state were thought to be an adequate basis for the tax. Although the
goods sold and delivered in the class D transactions were to be transported out of the taxing state immediately on delivery, that was held
not to affect the taxability of the transaction. Although the class D
sales were on the opposite end of the interstate journey from the
Berwind-White sales, it was thought to be authority for the class D
tax. The taxable event in each case was considered to be a "local
transaction" separate and distinct from the transportation in interstate commerce.
Thus, under the decision of the Berwind-White case and the class D
tax in the present case, the states at both ends of the interstate journey
204. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340,
345 (1944).
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would ostensibly have the authority to tax the proceeds of the interstate sale in full. The class D interstate sale might thus be subject
to the risk of cumulative tax burdens to the extent of the full amount
of the sale on each end of the journey. That argument apparently
was pressed upon the Court, but it side-tracked the issue with the
observation that "it will be time to cross that bridge when we get
to it. ' ' 20 The risk of having to pay a tax elsewhere was not enough
to hold the tax bad. The cumulative burden as thus argued is, in
essence, the same as the Berwind-White0 6 dissent conceived the
cumulative burden doctrine to be. It is interesting to speculate
whether the Court might have thought differently as to the validity
of the class D tax had the taxpayer shown that he actually was
subject to the burden of the tax at the end of the completed interstate journey. Presumably not. A similar argument was later made
in the 1947 case of InternationalHarvesterv. Evatt,20 7 which involved
a tax for the privilege of doing business of a multi-state enterprise,
measured by gross receipts from interstate sales of the manufactured
articles. The complaining taxpayer similarly argued that the Evatt
case tax, although apportioned, would be subject to the danger of
multiplication by other states. The Court answered that "since it
[the tax] is assessed only against the privilege of doing local Ohio
business of manufacturing and selling, we do not come to the question,
argued by appellant, of possible multiplication of this tax by reason
of its imposition by other States. None of them can tax the privilege
' 20 8
of operating factories and sales agencies in Ohio.
In class E sales, where the Indiana buyer bought goods from an
Indiana seller which shipped the goods to the buyer in Indiana from
points outside the state, the consummation of the transaction in Indiana was considered a taxable event. It was considered an event
distinct from the interstate movement of the goods and it took place
after the interstate journey ended. This is pretty much the BerwindWhite type situation. The court relied on the use tax cases to support
the tax in class E transactions, with a mention of the BerwindWhite case. In its reliance on the use tax cases, the Court took occasion to observe that while the gross receipts tax on the proceeds of
class E sales was different in name from a use tax, it was dealing with
matters of substance, and not with dialetics.
In the case of InternationalHarvester v. Department of Treasury,
the Court not only reaffirmed and applied the Berwind-White doctrine,
but it also applied the doctrine to a tax on the full sales price at the
beginning of the interstate journey. Without equivocation the Court
205. Id. at 348.
206. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 59 (1940).
207. 329 U.S. 416 (1947).

208. Id. at 423.
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when a "gross
also declared that there is no constitutional difference
20 9
receipts" tax, a "sales tax" or a "use tax" is utilized.
Beginning with the epochal Western Live Stock decision, the Court
had increasingly emphasized the consequences and effects, either
actual or threatened, of the questioned tax to hamper or hinder interstate transactions in deciding the commerce clause issue. In answering
the constitutional question, the dominant concern of the Court was
with whether the tax would place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage with local business. Without equivocation the
Court also had declared that there is no constitutional difference when
a "gross receipts" tax, a "sales tax" or a "use tax" is utilized. At
times, too, the Court had recognized that tax immunity to interstate
commerce would cause inequality of tax burden between competing
products to the prejudice of local business. In deciding whether the
state had exceeded commerce clause bounds, the Court had also given
weight to the essential fairness that interstate commerce should pay
its way. The Court further declared that there is the same practical
equivalence whether the tax is on the selling or the buying phase of
the transaction. Each was said to be in substance an imposition of
a tax on the transfer of property. Moreover, during the years following the Western Live Stock case the Court had obliterated the pointless, mechanical distinction between a tax levied "on" gross receipts
and taxes imposed on some other subject and "measured" by gross receipts. The exaction would be sustained if the proceeds taxed, whether
from sales transactions or from services, were fairly attributable to
activities and events having a substantial connection with the taxing
state. That was true whether the subject of the tax was some local
privilege measured by gross receipts, or whether the tax was laid
directly on gross receipts as the subject of the tax. Whatever the
subject of the tax, it would be nullified, however, if it threatened to
result in a heavier tax burden on interstate business than on a local
transaction. The emphasis and stress upon formulae and labels were
greatly reduced. A pragmatic approach to the problem had been
adopted and interstate commerce paid its way.
C. Retreat to the ConceptualApproach to Gross Receipts Taxes
1. Expansion of Zone of Tax Immunity and Resort to Mechanical
Tests of Taxability
All the practical considerations which were built up by the Court,

especially since the Western Live Stock case in 1938, were jettisoned in
1946 by Freeman v. Hewit,210 which again had up for consideration
209. See id. at 347-48.
210. 329 U.S. 249 (1946). "The failure of the Court to adhere to the
philosophy of our recent cases corroborates the impression which some of
us had that Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, marked the end of one cycle
under the Commerce Clause and the beginning of another." Mr. Justice
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Indiana's tax on gross income. There a trustee, domiciled in
Indiana, in managing the investment portfolio of a testamentary
trust created and administered under the laws of Indiana, placed
an order to sell certain stocks and bonds with an Indiana broker.
Through the New York correspondent of the Indiana broker the
securities were sold on the New York Stock Exchange. The proceeds
were delivered to the Indiana trustee. Indiana assessed a one per
cent tax on the amount received by the trustee.
A majority of the Supreme Court struck down the Indiana tax
as a burden on interstate commerce because the tax as applied was
laid "on the very sale" or "on the very processes" of interstate commerce. Speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Court dismissed the "cumulative burdens" test of constitutionality as mere
"fashions" in judicial writing, and resurrected the doctrine that the
states cannot tax interstate commerce at all. Moreover the economic
burden of the tax is said by the Freeman opinion to be irrelevant in
determining constitutionality. During the course of the opinion the
Court made it clear that it will brook no interference with interstate
commerce by way of taxation no matter how light the economic
burden:
"Nor is there any warrant in the constitutional principles heretofore
applied by this Court to support the notion that a State may be allowed
one single-tax-worth of direct interference with the free flow of commerce. Any exaction by a State from interstate commerce falls not
because of a proven increase in the cost of the product. What makes
the tax invalid is the fact that there is interference by a State with the
freedom of interstate commerce." 211
The sensible recognition that interstate commerce should "pay its
way" was thus abandoned. This doctrinal declaration of Freeman v.
Hewit thus marked a recrudescence of the view that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even by the very states where it operates
and whose protection the commerce enjoys and whose local businesses
must shoulder the tax. The doctrine that "practical rather than
logical distinctions must be sought" in deciding constitutional questions likewise was discarded.
The terminology which the Court used to condemn the Freeman
tax is a revised version of old labels. While Justice Strong and his
contemporaries in the 1870's said a tax was in conflict with the commerce clause if "on" interstate commerce, 212 and Justice Butler and
his school of judicial thought in the heyday of the "direct-indirect"
burdens test of the 1920's and 1930's condemned the tax if it was
Douglas dissenting in Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S.
422, 444 (1947).
211. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1946).
212. See Philadelphia and So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 341
(1887).
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thought to be a "direct burden, '213 Mr. Justice Frankfurter and those
of his persuasion will invalidate the tax if they conceive that it is
"directly on" interstate commerce, or levied "on the very processes"
of interstate commerce. Unfortunately, as we will continue to see,
the doctrines laid down in Freemanv. Hewit have been the pole star
by which the Court generally has since continued to steer in determining tax validity.
Obviously, the Freeman v. Hewit formula of constitutionality gives
but little help as to what is the stuff that makes a tax bad.214 Decisions

of the magnitude of the constitutionality of a tax should not be made
by resort to such labels or virtually meaningless formulas. As Justice
Cardozo once put it "a great principle of constitutional law is not
susceptible of comprehensive statement in an adjective. 215 Or as
Justice Stone declared in deprecating the "direct-indirect" burdens
test, it is "too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too
remote from actualities, to be of value," and to employ it was "little
more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
216
formula by which it is reached."
The Freeman dissent would have sustained the tax on the theory
that the gross receipts were the fair value of the "local activity" of
"management of the investment portfolio," which it compared with
manufacturing of goods, which was a taxable event in American
Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 217 and with publication of a trade

journal, which was the taxable event in the Western Live Stock 218
case. Both cases permitted gross proceeds to be used to value the
local activity. Nor would the Court agree to treat the Freeman tax
as levied on the privilege of "domicile" of the taxpayer, and measured
by the gross receipts. The Court would not adopt any of the approaches urged on it; instead it apparently reverted to the mechanical
unrealistic approach of invalidating a gross receipts tax when levied
"on" gross receipts attributable to a local activity; whereas a tax levied
on a local activity and measured by gross receipts presumably would
be upheld.
Because of the substantial local incidence of the transaction in
the taxing state, the gross receipts could have been used as a fair
value of that local activity. The local aspects of the transaction consisted not only of the domicile of the trustee and beneficiary but also
213. See New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes and Assessments,
280 U.S. 338, 346 (1930); Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S.
71, 83 (1924).
214. For an astute criticism of the Freeman case, see Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions,47 CoLum. L. REv. 211 (1947).
215. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
216. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
217. 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
218. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
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the situs of the trust.219 As we have already seen, the use of gross
receipts as a fair measure of a "local incident" has long been sanctioned. Although the Indiana tax had been construed as a tax "on
gross receipts," it has not been uncommon for the Court to look
beyond the statutory label placed on the tax and determine its
constitutionality by what the Court thinks is the incidence of the
tax. 2 20
The 1947 case of Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.,221
decided a year after Freeman v. Hewit, perpetuated the doctrine of
Freeman v. Hewit to the effect that interstate commerce is immune
from taxation. In so doing, the Court professed to apply the "multiple
burdens" doctrine. Carter & Weekes invalidated New York's gross
receipts tax as applied to stevedoring, where both interstate and foreign commerce were loaded and unloaded. Unable to find "stevedoring" distinct enough from interstate commerce to permit the tax on
the "local event" theory, the majority of the Court felt that the
tax violated the commerce clause insofar as the loading of interstate commerce was concerned. The Court then went further and
decided that the risk of a "multiple tax burden" was enough to
nullify the tax on commerce clause grounds because of the possibility of an additional tax on the unloading of the cargo at another
port of call in the United States. It seems clear that the "multiple
burdens" test as applied here means something entirely different
from the meaning used by Justice Stone. Statements of the multiple
burdens doctrine prior to Carter & Weeks had assumed the validity
of an apportioned gross receipts tax levied on a taxpayer engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce. For testing the validity of gross
receipts taxes, the multiple burdens test would appear to sanction a
separation of interstate commerce into as many taxable segments as
there are states through which the commerce passed. The "multiple
burdens" test as applied in Carter& Weekes is not so much a device
for validating taxes, as it is an additional hurdle which a challenged
tax must clear.= The "multiple burdens" doctrine has thus been
219. See Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47
CoLum. L. REV. 211, 226 (1947). That would have been in line with the
Court's earlier decision on Indiana's gross receipts tax. See, e.g., International
Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
220. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation,
322 U.S. 435 (1944); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940). The
Court has also disregarded the label given by state authorities to a tax and
has struck it down. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S.
359 (1954). Also, the Court had upheld Indiana's tax "on" gross proceeds,
which Freemanv. Hewit invalidated. The Court treated the receipts as fairly
attributable to a local event. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
221. 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
222. Essentially that same meaning was given the "multiple burdens" test
in the late case of Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157
(1954). For a strong plea that the "multiple burdens" doctrine as originally
developed to make interstate commerce pay its own way offers the best solu-
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tortured out of all recognition from its intended purpose of making
interstate commerce pay its way. The "multiple burdens" doctrine has
now become an additional weapon to be used in striking down a tax.
In Carter & Weekes the same incident, i.e., loading cargo, clearly
cannot be reached, taxwise, by any other state. The activity of loading was confined exclusively to the state that imposed the tax, and
a tax upon gross receipts from unloading in another state would be
taxation of receipts from an entirely separate activity. So, the risk
of multiple taxation of the same proceeds simply did not exist in
Carter & Weekes. Thus the Court's "multiple burdens" basis for
the unconstitutionality of the Carter & Weekes tax assumed the
existence of a premise which factually did not exist.
Local business in New York, including stevedoring, presumably
must pay the gross receipts tax litigated in Carter & Weekes on both
loading and unloading operations. Therefore, interstate commerce
would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage with local business
by reason of the tax. In fact, the effect of the Carter & Weekes holding that all gross proceeds from loading interstate commerce are
tax free gives to interstate commerce a large tax immunity as compared with the tax burden on local business. Thus, the law served not
to equalize the tax burden as between interstate and local business,
but to give interstate business a competitive advantage. The grant
of immunity to Carter & Weekes was thus the grant of a discriminatory preference to this interstate business-a result which it is exceedingly difficult to believe the commerce clause ever was intended
to achieve.
Beginning with Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,223 decided
two years after the Freeman decision and one year after Carter &
Weekes, there was an interlude of a much more sensible approach to
the problem of taxation of gross receipts than had been followed in
the Freemanand Carter & Weekes cases. The Mealey case involved a
New York statute which imposed a tax of two per cent on the gross
receipts of all utilities doing business within the state. The tax was applied to the total receipts of the Greyhound Bus Company derived from
transporting passengers from a point Within New York to another
point within the same state over a route which passed through New
Jersey and Pennsylvania. The Court held the tax an infringement of
the commerce clause on the ground that the unapportioned tax on the
gross receipts made interstate commerce bear more than its fair
share of the cost of local government. The tax would be upheld,
however, said the Court, if apportioned according to the percentage
tion yet devised by the judiciary to the problem of taxing interstate commerce, see Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Interstate Business, 4 TAx
L. REv. 95, 114-16 (1948).
223. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
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of the total mileage which was traversed within the taxing state.
There are two major phases to the rationale of the Mealey holding,
which are noteworthy. In the first place, a tax levied directly "on"
gross receipts was held to be a "direct" tax on interstate commerce.
In the second place because it was not fairly apportioned, the tax
could not escape the ban of the commerce clause. The dictum, however, says that if properly apportioned, such a tax, although levied
"on" gross receipts rather than "measured by" gross receipts, would
be upheld, at least insofar as gross receipts from interstate transportation are concerned.
By a reasonable interpretation, this dictum suggests the willingness of the Court to permit interstate commerce to be taxed, so
long as no other state can repeat the tax and thereby subject interstate commerce to multiple tax burdens not borne by local business.
This conclusion seems to follow from the Court's language, because
taxes levied "on" gross receipts have long been regarded as "direct"
in the cases which held that "direct" taxes on interstate commerce
are forbidden by the commerce clause.224 Unfortunately, the Court
resorted to the discredited practice of using "direct" to condemn the
tax, since it agreed that an apportioned tax would be sustained. Apportioned valid taxes are none the less "direct" than are unapportioned
invalid taxes. It is significant to note that the Court did not follow
the earlier artificial distinction that it is not competent for a state to
levy a tax "on" gross receipts from an interstate transaction; but that
the state could nevertheless constitutionally levy a tax "on" certain
local incidents and measure the tax by gross receipts from an
interstate transaction, even though the revenue derived from the
business of the taxpayer in both situations was precisely the same.
In the 1949 case of Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone,225 four of
the nine members of the Court voted to sustain a tax on the privilege
of doing business measured by the gross receipts from the operation
of an interstate pipe line, engaged in transporting oil exclusively in
interstate commerce. A fifth justice voted to uphold the tax on the
ground that the event taxed was a local activity. Thus the tax was
sustained, but the remaining four members of the Court dissented.
They took the view that "the privilege of carrying on interstate
commerce itself is immune from state taxation," because "the commerce clause of the Constitution does not leave to the States any
power to permit or refuse the carrying on of interstate commerce."
As the case stands, it means but little, since later pronouncements
by the Court make it clear that it will not uphold a tax which it
thinks is an encroachment on the privilege of engaging in interstate
224. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917); Leloup v. Port of
Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888).
225. 337 U.S. 662 (1949).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 9

commerce.
When gross receipts from sales are taxed, the Court
still clings to the view that a state has no taxable grip on the interstate sales operation unless "some local incident occurs sufficient to
bring the transaction within its taxing power."22 7 An occupation tax
on the business of selling at retail, where the basis for computation of
the tax is gross receipts, is permissible in so far as the commerce clause
is concerned, only if the Court concludes that the taxed event is a
local incident. That is the teaching of Norton Co. v. Department of
Revenue.= There the state could constitutionally impose a tax on the
occupation of selling, measured by gross receipts, where the local
branch of the multi-state business either received the order or distributed the goods sent from an extra-state branch. However, by the
same Norton case a state cannot reach the gross receipts from orders
sent directly to an out-of-state branch of business by customers and
shipped directly to the customers from the out-of-state branch. Such
proceeds are said not to be reasonably attributable to a local business.
2. Gross Receipts as a Factor in a Fiscal Formula
When a state tries to use gross receipts to ascertain the value of a
local activity for tax purposes, it may use the receipts as the only
measure of the value of the privilege, or the receipts may be one of
several factors in the formula. A fiscal formula for computing the
value of the activity in a far-flung multi-state business may include
a portion of the gross receipts from sales, along with such other factors
as the capital stock.
That principle is demonstrated in International Harvester Co. v.
Evatt229 where a tax on the privilege of doing business was computed,
in part, on the basis of gross receipts from both interstate and intrastate sales, and partly on a proportion of the capital stock of the
corporation. Taxpayer was engaged in manufacturing and marketing
machinery. Factories, warehouses and sales agencies were owned by
taxpayer both within and beyond the taxing state. The business of
taxpayer within the taxing state was valued partly by the value of
products sold outside the state, as well as by goods manufactured outside the state and sold within the taxing state. The tax was resisted
on both commerce and due process clause grounds. The taxpayer
contended that this transformed the tax on its business to a tax on
an activity outside the taxing state, in violation of the due process, as
well as the commerce clause. The Court sustained the tax, however.
The Court rejected the commerce clause arguments, since the apportionment formula used to determine the value of the local business
226. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
227. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
228. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
229. 329 U.S. 416 (1947).
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was thought to be fair. The fact that the computation included receipts from interstate sales did not, thought the Court, affect the
validity of a fair apportionment. Using gross receipts from interstate sales to determine the fair value of a local activity such as manufacturing, of course, has long been regarded as sound commerce clause
gospel.
Rejecting the due process argument also, the Court made it clear
that a tax will not be invalidated merely because the result is achieved
through a formula which takes into consideration interstate and
out-of-state transactions having a relation to the local privilege. The
privilege of doing business within the state is made more valuable
owing to its being part of a multistate enterprise. The recognition of
that fact for tax purposes is not in itself a violation of the due process
clause. The opportunities afforded by the taxing state have a direct
and substantial relationship to the interstate operations. So reasoned
the Court.
Ford Motor Company v. Beauchamp2o not only shows the various
factors that may go into the allocation formula, along with gross receipts from sales, but it also represents an expansion of the idea
of the value, to a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, of the
privilege of doing local business, beyond the value of the property
actually employed within the taxing state. There, Texas levied an
annual franchise tax on every domestic and foreign corporation
authorized to do business in the state, measured by a charge upon such
proportion of (a) the outstanding capital stock; (b) surplus and undivided profits of the corporation; plus (c) the long-term indebtedness,
as the gross receipts from its Texas business bore to its total receipts.
The complaining taxpayer, Ford Motor Company, sent parts into
Texas for assembly and intrastate sale to dealers. Ford's capital, as
defined in the statute, was over $600,000,000. Total gross receipts for
the year were over $800,000,000; Texas gross receipts were over $34,000,000. The capital allocable to Texas by the statutory formula was
over $23,000,000; and the book value of all assets located in Texas was
around $3,000,000. Payment was made under protest and suit instituted to recover the amount of tax paid on the $20,000,000 in excess
of the book value of assets in Texas. The taxpayer contended that
the tax was at war with the commerce clause in that it was levied
on assets used in interstate business; and that it was repugnant to
the due process clause because it taxed activities and property outside
the taxing state and over which it had no jurisdiction.
Over these objections, the Court sustained the tax. The Court was
satisfied that the statutory formula for arriving at the amount of the
tax did not violate either clause of the Constitution since the measure
230. 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
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of the tax only recognized the increased value of the privilege of
doing business within the state resulting from the use of property
beyond the state. In essence, the Court was of the opinion that it was
a legitimate franchise tax for the privilege of carrying on business in
Texas. The exploitation by a foreign corporation of interstate opportunities under the protection and encouragement of a state government
afforded a sufficient basis for the taxation. In levying the privilege
tax, the state was simply placing a charge upon that privilege commensurate with the protection it afforded.
The Beauchamp ,nd Evatt decisions give realistic recognition to the
national character of the modern corporation whose property is
scattered through several states, but whose use, management and
balance sheet are unitary. While apportionments between the intrastate and interstate activities have been upset upon a showing
that they were materially contrary to fact, or that improper factors
have been included, the Court found that that argument had no
basis in Beauchamp and Evatt cases for the reason that the apportionment formula in each case was found to be fair; and capital employed
in any part of these multistate businesses tended to make every other
part of the business more valuable. In a large unitary enterprise such
as the Ford Motor Company and International Harvester, property
located outside the state, when correlated in use with property within
the state, almost of necessity it seems, must affect the worth of the
privilege within the state. So, in determining the value of the intrastate privilege, the weight given to the value of the property beyond
the boundaries of the taxing state is simply a recognition of the value
of the privilege granted by the taxing state.
The "unit rule" followed in Beauchamp and Evatt was originally
developed to apportion property or earnings of such unitary enterprises as communication or transportation companies. 23' Those, of
course, are companies whose property does have real intangible value
above its physical worth owing to its use as part of one entire enterprise, and whose earnings are incapable of separation into the respective portions derived from intrastate and interstate business. This
"unit rule" has been thus extended, wisely it seems, to corporations
engaged in production and selling activities. While it may be more
difficult to determine what rightfully belongs to a state when a sale
is concerned in multi-state sales than when the receipts are from
multi-state transportation or communication, as Beauchamp and Evatt
show, there can be a constitutional allocation of income from multistate enterprises whose income is derived from interstate sales.
The task to which the Court should direct its efforts when a state
231. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Missouri ex tel. Gottlieb, 190 U.S. 412 (1903).
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is taxing a multistate business enterprise is the determination of what
portion of the business organism may fairly be attributed to the taxing state. That portion of the business fairly attributable to the
state should be a proper subject for raising revenue for the state, under
whose protection the business is carried on, irrespective of whether the
Court can segregate some part of the business and call it a "local
activity." An interstate business ought not be given a tax preference
over local business. That ought to be the real nub of the commerce
clause issue, whether the state is trying to reach gross receipts derived from interstate sales or services, or whether the state has levied
a property tax on such unitary multistate enterprises as transportation
and communication systems. Such is not the law, however. When
proceeds from sales and services are affected by a tax, the Court
must still find that some "local incident" occurs to bring the transaction within the taxing power of the state. In sales taxation the Court
continues to follow a rule which will "relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their fair share of the expense of government of
the states in which they operate by exempting them from the payment of a tax of general application, which is neither aimed at nor
discriminates against interstate commerce." 232
232. Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis protesting against the tax immunity given in Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1929).

